Mayo 23, 2007
Proceso 1242

The Latin American communist parties
The newspaper La Prensa Grafica published a report about the implications of the KGB –the espionage agency of the former USSR- in the Salvadoran civil war, and it seems that it unleashed favorable reactions because this is a way to know the historic perspective of that stage that El Salvador went through from 1981 to 1992. This appreciation of the events revealed the existence of unpublished documents and interviews with agents from the USSR that were involved in the operations programmed by the former socialist power to support the actions of the Salvadoran insurgence. In order to know what happened, it is not only necessary to gather information or to identify the hidden sources, but to analyze this historic process. To think the contrary is to see things through the eyes of an absurd positivism with epistemological limitations that can easily damage the work of any historian.
           
            The flaws of this report have to do with the fact that it reveals a weak historic interpretation of the connection between the former USSR with the communist Latin American political parties, since these were created back in the 1920’s during the 20th Century. In the case of the sources and the interviews that the paper used, it was definitively important to work on a report like this and to reveal this information; however, that does not mean that they actually improved their understanding of the relation between the Communist Party of the USSR and the Communist Party of El Salvador –and the FMLN, in the eighties- during the different stages that the latter went through since it was created.
In fact, the weak aspects of this work are evident when it comes to evaluate the contribution of this feature story to the historic knowledge of El Salvador. Their interpretation of what happened in the years when the KGB was part of the civil war is just an anecdotic text, a discourse about personal negotiations where those involved decided –in El Salvador as well as abroad, in the former USSR- which cards to pick and how to place their bets. That is why in this feature story they use expressions such as “conspiracy” and “complot” to name actions that were actually policies of the Soviet State, just as it was the assistance and the training offered by the United States to the Nicaraguan “Contra”.
            In order to use the sources and the interviews as they have to be used it is necessary to have a much wider range of an interpretative background in reference to the relations of the former USSR with its allies. Their list of allies did not only include the Cuban government, but also the communist parties that had decided to be faithful to their cause. This article will offer a few clues to improve that interpretative background. It would be important to perform a similar analysis with the relations between the United States and the military dictatorships throughout the 20th Century in Latin America.
            The Communist Parties are basically created during the thirties in Latin America, and their organizational format is similar to the one used by the PCUS: a General Secretary located in the most important position of the party; a Central Committee subjected to the first one; and the militants located at the base of this institution, responsible for promoting the orders of the party. Their ideological approaches were rigid and simple, but they varied with time at least until the late seventies. First they changed the guidelines of the International Communist Organization back in 1943 when this organization was dissolved, and then they changed the ones of the PCUS.
            From a practical perspective, the Latin American communist parties adapted themselves to the needs of the former USSR, especially after they imposed Stalin’s thesis, “Socialism in just one country” against Trotsky. By 1935, before the presence of the fascist menace, the Soviets promoted a strategy of “popular fronts”, something that means that they have to postpone their fight against bourgeoisie. In the heat of this idea, it occurs to them something that decisively establishes the presence of the communist parties in Latin America in the mid fifties. They chose to defend democracy, but they insist on the fact that it is impossible to adopt it right away, since they need specific economic and political conditions to achieve it. A political democracy requires a national bourgeoisie.
            What about socialism? What about communism? Both goals are not abandoned, but they insist that it is important to first create the democratic and the bourgeois conditions that are necessary for their project. This is the famous thesis of the stages: first they install the democratic and the bourgeois orders –with the communist cooperation- in order to make the transition into socialism and communism. This is not a strategy chosen by the local communist parties, but a plan that came from the PCUS.
            This is precisely the predominant conception in the communist circles when the Cuban Revolution explodes back in 1959. The Soviets witnessed how their strategy was altered. Soon, however, they integrated the Cuban revolutionary project to their own vision of the construction of socialism. They rejected similar efforts in places where nothing like this had been done before or where there were no possibilities to succeed. They did not hesitate to adopt them when the victory was theirs –for instance, during the Sandinista Revolution- or when they were at the doors of a sure thing –as it seemed to be in El Salvador in the early eighties-. This was a pragmatic attitude that, since Vladimir Lenin, the Russian communists always knew how to blend with the Marxist and the Leninist ideological principles.
            This was not a matter of individual or personal decisions because this was the way the Soviet State worked as a whole, the way the PCUS worked. That pragmatism was turned into the decisions of the foreign policies, which were not always coherent with each other, but that intended to strengthen the role of the former USSR in a scenario defined by the most important blocks of power and the cold war. The United States did as much in those spheres influenced by its power. With the Perestroika, in the mid-eighties, a different logic was adopted; a logic that not only redefined the international relations of the former USSR, but that it also, with time, made it disappear along with its project of a real socialism.

The protest of the informal vendors

The problems connected with the informal trade sector keep turning more complex every day. With the presence of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, adopted a year ago this last March, the Government insisted on applying the laws connected with the intellectual property to fight against the informal market, that is, to fight against the informal trade sector.
            To all this we can add the conflicts that the City Hall of San Salvador has had in the last few years with the territorial redefinition plan and the project aimed to “rescue” of the Historic Center of the city occupied by the informal trade sector. A similar situation is taking place in other important cities of the country, such as Apopa and Cojutepeque, in the Department of Cuscatlán. In fact, in Cuscatlán, the informal vendors closed the Pan-American road for more than an hour as a sign of protest because the municipality asked the street vendors to leave.
            Unfortunately, to this date there has not been one single plan aimed to end with this problem at once, or any initiatives that might have brought positive results for the informal vendors involved. Most of them make a very small income, and they have found a way to make ends meet in the informal trade business. This analysis and this problem should be equally important for the Executive power and for the City Hall of San Salvador, as well as for other city halls with the same problem. While there are no specific agreements between these two levels of administration and the informal vendors, the solution will never arrive.
            On the other hand, the media that usually support the perspectives of the right wing, such as the Salvadoran Tele-Corporation (TCS) and El Diario de Hoy, make a terrible mistake when they blame the FMLN for just about any incident connected with the informal trade sector. This biased coverage is the way in which these media cover-up the true aspects of this problem: the unfair conditions created by the Neo-liberal economic system promoted by ARENA.
            Just like those communication media, the Minister of Public Security and Justice, Rene Figueroa, and the President of El Salvador himself, Elias Antonio Saca, should be more responsible with the statements they make about the public disorders that took place on last May 12th and that were allegedly promoted by street vendors. This situation has not been verified yet, there are no formal investigations connected to it. This lack of investigation shows the ineptitude of the governmental officials, incapable to resolve the problems of the Salvadoran society.

Confiscation and answer
In the afternoon of May 12th, several agents of the National Civilian Police (PNC, in Spanish) confiscated merchandise that belonged to a group of informal vendors. They had compact discs, movies, and other products connected with the informal market. In answer to the actions of the police, about 200 vendors organized a demonstration that was later tarnished by critical incidents. The damages included a vehicle that belonged to the PNC, a vehicle of the Salvadoran Tele-Corporation, and a car that belonged to an unidentified person. These vehicles were set on fire and several stores were looted, according to a spokesperson of the PNC, Carlos Rugamas. Several individuals took advantage of the public disorder to steal merchandise from the stores in the area, this situation created a sense of panic and the local people were concerned.
            In the meantime, the Order Maintenance Unit (UMO, in Spanish) was nowhere to be found for at least a couple of hours. When the UMO finally arrived, its members used tear gas grenades and shot rubber bullets against the demonstrators that ran through the streets of the city. The emblematic buildings of the National Theater, the National Palace, and the Metropolitan Cathedral were surrounded by a smoke curtain due to the gases used by the UMO. The confrontation expanded itself to the area of the Ex-Cuartel market, the First and the Third Streets West, the Spain Avenue, and the surroundings of the Sacred Heart Market. That day, the police reported the arrest of at least 17 people, some of them were brought to the police station because they did not listen to the indications of the authorities, as in the case of three individuals that were arrested close to the Cathedral, who disobeyed the police officers and went inside an area controlled by the authorities. The number of arrests increased with the revelation that, among them, there were two minors. The Historic Center was finally in peace by 7:30 in the evening of that day.
            While all this was happening, the emergency voluntary bodies helped dozens of people that were affected by the gases. The Red Cross evacuated the clients and the employees of the flea markets that surround the National Theater area. In addition, they helped the clients of a store that were affected by the pepper gas that came from a bomb that exploded inside the store. The spokesperson of the Saviors’ Command, Eduardo Mayen, confirmed that, while the whole emergency lasted, they took care of approximately 150 people, among them, a wounded police agent and a member of their team that had been attacked by alleged street vendors.

Irresponsible accusations
A day after the public disorders took place, the President, Antonio Saca, and the Minister of Public Security and Justice, Rene Figueroa, said that this situation was an act of “terrorism”. In addition, they indicated that the FMLN had been the promoter of this sort of outrageous disorders. Figueroa indicated that the opposition has a “destabilization” plan prepared for the 2009 elections. “We know, because we have information about it, that the left wing’s communist party (the FMLN) created support groups that went out to the streets in several cities, and they were accompanied by other sectors involved in the transactions of the black market” Figueroa stated. President Saca indicated that there were many pieces of evidence available to incriminate the opposition. He said that “several congressmen of the FMLN, with the excuse that they were just passing by, decided to help; but a person that does not agree with this sort of actions does no even get close to a person who is about to commit a crime”. Among the evidences that they refer to there is a recorded phone call of congressman Salvador Sanchez Ceren requesting the police a respectful attitude towards the rights of the people involved in the public disorders. They also count among the evidences a picture of another congressman of the FMLN, Salvador Arias, acting as a mediator between the police agents and the street vendors.
            The Auxiliary Archbishop of San Salvador, Monsignor Gregorio Rosa Chavez stated that he did not agree with the accusations made by Saca and Figueroa. He indicated that with this kind of behavior the government is not seriously analyzing the problems of the informal vendors. According to the priest, the city has been for many years “a nest for the most terrible things: organized crime, drug-dealing business, illegal trade, stolen merchandise exchange…The authorities know about this, and there are people that do not want to see this come to an end”.
            No one can ignore the suspicious actions of the police bodies that were in the area that day. The PNC decided to confiscate the merchandise without speaking with the City Hall of San Salvador first, during the very same day in which the city hall had agreed with several street vendors that they would move their business to another area. The UMO took two hours to arrive. According to Pedro Julio Hernandez, a leader of the National Coordination System of Vendors (CNV), the affected street vendors did protest but the public disorders were created by people that had nothing to do with them, that is, infiltrated people, sent by the government to “destabilize” the informal sector in question.
            Just like Monsignor Rosa Chavez indicated, this problem of the street vendors is nothing new. The authorities because of their ineptitude or because they are the accomplices of a suspicious situation, have intensified a problem that is now out of control. This situation has been used by the Executive power with electoral purposes, and not seriously enough in order to resolve the socioeconomic differences that are the bottom line of the whole conflict. A representative sample of the careless way in which this problem has been handled is the irresponsible and the visceral statements made by Figueroa and Saca, statements that usually link any sort of public disorders with the FMLN.
                     
           
Other articles featured in this issue of Proceso: