PROCESO — WEEKLY NEWS BULLETINEL SALVADOR, C.A.

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     Proceso is published weekly in Spanish by the Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI) of the Central American University (UCA) of El Salvador. Portions are sent in English to the *reg.elsalvador* conference of PeaceNet in the USA and may be forwarded or copied to other networks and electronic mailing lists. Please make sure to mention Proceso when quoting from this publication.

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Proceso 996
April 24 , 2002
ISSN 0259-9864
 
 

INDEX


Editorial:Electoral visits
Politics: The legislative coup, two years later
Economy:The economy inside the Venezuelan politics
 
 
 
 
 

EDITORIAL


Electoral visits

    When the recently designated president of ARENA launched the party's new electoral campaign, he asked the party’s members to visit communities and towns to identify the needs of the population, in order to fight against the indifference about the elections and politics in general. It seems as if one of the parties that constantly repeats that its administration is for the people does not really know the people's needs and has to pay visits to understand what it presently ignores. A party that, in fact, focuses its administration on the people would already know those needs and would not have to plan any visits with that purpose alone. If everyone were sure that the needs are fulfilled, anybody would definitively be more interested to participate in politics and in the next elections.

    On the other hand, it is a fact that ARENA knows very well the needs of the business elite. Some of the ARENA members are part of that elite. The private business sector usually gets together with the government to inform it about its needs and plan the governmental tasks for the next year. This elite counts with the support of the media to constantly remind the government about their needs, and to demand the necessary policies to fulfill them. Some members of that business elite are also a part of the higher governmental circles. They also have private channels to let the Executive power know their needs and complaints.

    The rest of the population does not have so many opportunities to be heard. The political parties, who should fill that empty space, are so selfish that they only care about their own interests. It seems as if the population were obliged to observe, not without a certain astonishment, how the adopted decisions are always inclined to favor the same sector. It cannot be said that that the business companies' demands include those of the population, not even supposing that they benefit the entire country. That is just an old nonsense that already lost its credibility. This is why a great amount of citizens lost their interest in the elections. For the citizenry it is all the same whoever the government is, since nobody will bring new meaning to the daily life.

    It is understandable that a party that wishes to control the Legislative Assembly and most of the town councils, for the next year's elections, goes out to ask for more votes, since the number of votes determines the positions granted by the popular elections. Who will form the new Legislative assembly will depend on the citizens' vote, the distribution of the town councils will also depend on it. ARENA will only be able to have a larger amount of congressmen and regain the counties in which the urban population is concentrated if it is able to get the vote of those that are not close followers of the party. The sympathizers' votes will not be enough to make the party win the elections. The electoral process is seen as a fundamental part of democracy, however, the way it works in El Salvador is very questionable. The majority's vote is needed to grant the administration to a party that rules exclusively for a minority.

    ARENA must turn to its followers and its sympathizers, who are discontent with the changes that were made at the party. They do not feel represented nor identified with the business elite members that now run the party. ARENA also experiments serious internal injuries that revolve around a few families and certain interests, even an unhappy sector has turned away to prepare their own right-wing party. The media carefully tries to hide ARENA's internal reality, while it exaggerates the situation at the FMLN. Contrary to what the press says, the business elite does not have an acceptable image. For the media, the business elite is a group of successful people, because they have conquered the market and because they have a lot of money; however, most of the population has a very different opinion. It is necessary to add that the business elite that runs ARENA does not have  any kind of a leadership, neither inside nor outside the party, they do not have charisma either. Therefore, it seems as if it is convenient for ARENA to renovate its relationship with its followers and with the population, even if that is a difficult task, since its leaders are more dedicated to their business companies than to politics, and because it is not simple for them to relate to those who do not belong to their same social level.

    Anyhow, the visits could help ARENA to open its relations and overcome the inflexibility that presently paralyzes it. As it is usual, the already mentioned visits will be followed by all kinds of promises. However, the people is wiser than ARENA: the people accepts what they give them, but observes with skepticism the moves that the parties make to convince them to vote for them. The campaigns’ promises have an echo on that population who still awaits for the government to do something. However, only a very small amount of the population still expects the government to help them resolve their problems. Most of them do not expect anything, but to emigrate. To turn the apathy into votes is directly related with the results and benefits that the governmental administration can provide to a population with unsatisfied basic needs and with an unclear future.

    ARENA, as the party in the government, should know those needs very well, since it counts with the means to identify them. Therefore, the invitation of ARENA's president does not make much sense, unless he considers that, in fact, the party is not at the service of the majority, but it has to get closer to them as a stranger, to know them. In fact,  it would be a good idea for the businessmen to get close to the Salvadorans' reality, even if it were to get their vote. That would be a way to look into the economic and the social policies that they have encouraged during the last decade.
 

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POLITICS

The legislative coup, two years later

    The leaders of ARENA, PCN and PDC cannot be asked for too many explanations about their acid remarks concerning the recent events at Venezuela. It is already known that for many legislators who belong to these three right-wing parties, the Coup d'etat against Hugo Chavez was legitimate, since the intended purpose was to stop the growth of the left-wing side at that nation. The struggle of the military men responsible for the Coup d'etat actions would be a little bit similar to its “bold” effort, here in El Salvador,  to stop the a socialist wave. They had to do whatever they consider possible to stop the communist growth that the FMLN represents for them. A legal last-minute maneuver stopped the spell. They reformed the internal regulations of the Legislative Assembly. They agreed to share, for a year, its presidency. With that, they also abolished the former regulation, according to which the party that had more congressmen would conduct the Assembly during a three year period. Now, sure about accomplishing their objective –to prevent the left-wing from having an open tribune at the center of the state-, they modify the already mentioned regulations once again, according to the terms that were in effect before the electoral rise of the FMLN. Two years later,  what is the right-wing's legislative balance?

    If the parliamentary performance is seen in the terms of the confrontation between the left and the right-wing, there is no doubt that right-wing has seen the results of its efforts. Along these two last years, the FMLN has not been able to finish with any of its legislative projects. They have been neutralized by the alliance of the right-wing parties. Besides from the space that the news media give them, their presence at the Assembly has not had an important influence on the national political life. And, to make things even worse, the left-wing party will end this legislative period with an internal hemorrhage that, without a doubt, will have an important influence on their electoral results during the next elections. The defection of a considerable number of congressmen, for whom the left-wing party does not represent any power option at all anymore, it is only an image of the crisis that the left-wing has suffered with this legislature.

    The right-wing, instead, has a more secure situation because of the comfortable support that it has since it counts with the necessary votes to approve its legislative projects. With this, it has consolidated its control over the national life. The way it has easily imposed its legislative initiatives along these two last years is a palpable testimony. In that sense, it can be said that the right wing has a triumph with its "counter-insurgence" project, inaugurated after knowing the 2000 electoral results. And, based on that fact, it has monopolized the effective action inside the Assembly. That is why the institution that should represent the debate, the settlement, and the effort of the Salvadorans to build a new country, has turned into a pale image of itself. That is the reason why one of the most important tasks is to identify some of the consequences for the Salvadorans after the triumph of the legislative coup that the right-wing performed.

    Even if the legislative project's triumph against the parliamentary left-wing has shown its efficiency along the last couple  of years, that does not mean that it has helped to improve the Legislative Assembly's image that the Salvadoran society has. On the contrary, the opinion that predominated in the environment is that such institution has turned into an obstacle against the country's democratization process. It could not be less than that. The political party agenda that has led the way, as far as this legislature is concerned, excludes any possibility for an open discussion, since it has nothing to do with the interests of the population. The right-wing, specially the ARENA party, has taken the time along this legislative period to exclude the left-wing from politics. The same can be said about the right-wing's "affair" with the Renovators, the FMLN's dissidents. About this last subject, many suspect that some of the important members of the right-wing contributed with large amounts of money to encourage the divorce process between the renovators and the FMLN. All of those actions would be a part of the anti-left-wing operation that began with the legislative coup that took place on May 1st. 2000.

    However, on the other hand, besides the discredit and the persistence of the most negative evaluations that the Legislative institution has received, its decisions have not contributed to improve the situation of the Salvadoran population. There is no doubt that the right-wing block had a long-winded activity as far as the legislative production is concerned. Somehow, there is a contradiction inside the initiatives that have been encouraged and the actual needs of the Salvadorans. That should be the focal point of the discussion about the discredit that the issue of politics has, a subject endlessly discussed in this country.

    Therefore, the left-wing's lack of efficiency is not only the result of its inability to reach an agreement with the rest of the blocks present at the Legislative Assembly. Even if the mistakes that the FMLN has displayed along this legislative period cannot be forgotten, to correctly understand the country's situation it is necessary to remember the plan prepared to achieve its inefficiency and inability to affect the political decisions that are taken at this institution.  In this context, it is necessary to be aware about the obstruction and the polarization that the national political life suffers obeys to the will of other political approaches.

    It is evident that the political exclusion of the contrary tendencies that takes place at the Assembly is not the best way to encourage the democratic debate in the country. The reproduction of the authoritarian scheme contradicts the spirit of a parliament. The ARENA, PCN, and the PDC parties turn -because of this authoritarian practice at the legislative Organ- into the main enemies of the institution. That is the place where they should look for a solution to the image problems that the parliamentary activities have. Otherwise there will not be enough advertising campaigns to convince the Salvadoran population about the importance of this institution in the country's life.

    During this May 1st, when the Legislative Assembly's Directive Board will be about to suffer some changes, the congressmen should make certain considerations.  To pretend -as Walter Araujo says-, that legislative meetings in the different departments will be enough to get closer to the population is a mistake of considerable proportions. The closeness of the Assembly depends on how much it incorporates the interests of the Salvadorans in the laws. Only with that certainty, the Salvadorans will change their opinion about this institution.

    Given the present context, nothing much can be expected for this last legislative year: the institution has not been able to respond to the country's problems. Despite the discourses, the new legislative year (in a pre-elections year) threatens to intensify the confrontations between the right and the left wing. It would be an ingenuous attitude to suppose that in a year they will accomplish what it has not been done in two years. It is almost certain that that the right-wing will intensify its battle against the FMLN to finish its task. The FMLN, instead, will have to try to reduce their conflicts in order to avoid the debacle during this legislative year.

    A difficult year is on its way for the national politics. It is not very probable that this situation will contribute to improve, in a democratic sense, the country's political culture. In the same way, the authoritarian attitudes, the political exclusion, intransigence, and the lack of will to establish a dialogue will keep threatening, without a doubt, the transition. This is not a flattering prediction for a country that celebrates with an official pomp the tenth year anniversary of the Peace Agreements.

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ECONOMY

The economy inside the Venezuelan politics

    After the recent events at Venezuela, different interpretations have been made about its crisis. The Salvadoran government, the opposition, and the news media have made their own interpretation of the situation, mostly from an ideological perspective. The right-wing deeply despises those who pretend, at least with their discourse, to transform the society; and the left-wing wants to make these kind of transformations, sometimes, without considering the exaggerations and using fundamentalist inspirations.

    This is not about defending the performance of the Chavez administration, nor about condemning him. The Venezuelan case deserves a less passionate examination about the economic content of its governmental foundations. Without a doubt, this could help to explain why a considerable part of the opposition against its government came from the business companies' sector, that is, the social sector with more economic power, which has more to lose with a transformation project. The background of the most recent Venezuelan crisis is shaped by the different measures of the economic reform both proposed and implemented by Chavez. One of the last economic reforms was connected to the company in charge of the production and the marketing of the Venezuelan petroleum and, apparently, it was the straw that broke the camel’s back.

The official diagnosis of the Venezuelan economy
    Inside the Governmental Program of Hugo Chavez, the economic area plays a key role to understand, in part, the discontent of the business sector in particular, and its active role in the failed coup d'etat. That program includes considerations about the social and the economic situation, after which the government does not hesitate to point out that the Venezuelan situation needs certain changes, at least, for three reasons: the disadvantages of the petroleum mono-production, the concentration of wealth (an argument that recalls the sixties), and the unfulfilled  social needs.

    The Venezuelan government accepts that "the petroleum's dependency remains as a structural feature that determines the national economic orientation". This idea also shows that, after the seventies, the "encouraging capability of the petroleum's income" was reduced, due to facts related with its amount as with the State's control over that income. In the present -adds the official version-, a considerable amount of resources has been invested in a sector that generates both low employment and low added value levels, and which is supported by a "policy that concentrates wealth, power and population".

    Because of the former ideas, the need for a "deep structural transformation of the Venezuelan economy is acknowledged, and the first step is the approval of the new Constitution emerged from the constituent process".  That is how the Chavez administration would be proposing the transformation from an income model to a productive one, that can promote sectors such as the consumption of goods, the basic utilities and services, and governmental services, which he considers as areas that can generate a high rate of employment and a strong multiplying effect.

    With that, it intends to revert the former model, which was "oriented, in the first place, to the accumulation of profits for a small group of people; and later on, to the preservation of its privileges. That deteriorated the Venezuelan life standards, and went against of the environmental conditions".

The proposal made by Chavez
    In his governmental plan, Chavez establishes that he will search for a "humanitarian, self-managed and competitive economy". First, because he will place the people as the center of his administration, and to accomplish that task he will look after the generation of employment, and sustainable conditions for the environment that will help to fulfill the population's needs. In the second place, because he will look for  a self-manageable economic system that encourages the "economic democratization" and alternative organization activities such as cooperatives. Finally, because it is necessary to promote a competitive economy, able to generate products that can satisfy the needs of the population as well as "compete with foreign merchandise", counting with an adequate public and private support.

    To shape this new economic model, the Governmental Program approaches a necessary examination of three fundamental aspects: the relations between the state and the society, the creation of a model divided in five sectors, and the macroeconomic courses of action. The reformulation of the relations between the state and the society contemplates five general measures, three of them can be considered as the most important ones: first,  to complement the action of the market with "the State's visible hand" in order to mitigate the  problem of the uneven distribution of wealth that generates "poverty in large sectors of the society". Second,  to promote productive activities that can improve the satisfaction of the domestic demand and encourage the "cooperation and the exchange" between Venezuela and the global market. Third, to create regulation systems at the State to control the use of public services and natural monopolies.

    The economic proposal of the Chavez administration clearly shows that his philosophic inspiration is very different from the one that most  Latin American governments have. They have easily accepted to implement the Neoliberal measures to dismantle the State, the deregulation of the markets, and the commercial openness. Therefore, it should not seem odd if the economic approaches that Chavez made are scary to some people. It is not strange either that some resistances and antibodies have been developed to explode on the day that he decided to restructure the managerial elements of the Venezuelan petroleum company.

    This context has not been thoroughly discussed. Instead, taking advantage of the of the fall and the raise of Chavez, many sectors have uttered caustic comments against this government based on what can be inferred from the April 11th events  -the massacre of demonstrators- or from the most authoritarian attitudes shown by Chavez. Others, with much ingenuity, at times have shown favorable attitudes towards the Chavez administration, specially those connected with the left-wing. El Salvador has not been the exception: an extremely superficial examination of the events was made public by the newspapers.

The Salvadoran reactions
    In addition to the unfortunate and widely advertised declarations of the Salvadoran  President, Francisco Flores,  giving his support to the ephemeral government that took over the country after the coup d'etat,  other interpretations also allowed people to see the absurd disdain that many right-wing members have for the Chavez administration. Columnists, editorialists, aficionados, and even house wives have criticized the Venezuelan government and any left-wing movement. That is how after the brief  overthrow of Chavez, somebody  said that "Venezuela closed last night one of the darkest passages of its history. The intent of a new and a so called left-wing to assault a democracy could not even take three days of a general strike". The president of the National Association of the Private Business Companies (ANEP, in Spanish) immediately sent, after the coup d'etat,  a letter of support and solidarity to the "new" government -headed by the president of the Venezuelan chamber of commerce-, in which he said that the situation "showed the strategic role of the private sector for the development and the defense of democracy".

    Several members of the Salvadoran "new left-wing" did not hesitate to show their discontent for the so called coup d'etat at Venezuela, and their almost unconditional support to Chavez. For example, Salvador Sánchez Cerén, the FMLN's coordinator,  said that  "this coup d'etat shows once again the sad and shameful story that most armies have played in Latin America as instruments of the wealth", since the Chavez government "encouraged economic transformations to benefit the majorities'.

Some lessons
    There is no doubt that Hugo Chavez awakens confronted passions, due to his clear way to face the economic, social and environmental contradictions of Venezuela, which are -fundamentally- shared by most of the Latin American countries. Just like it happened with Salvador Allende, Chavez represents the rebelliousness and the dissonant voice in the Latin American scenery where everyone should dance to the same rhythm. The intents to transform an economy through a wider intervention of the State in the production and the distribution of goods and services, and in the regulation of private sector did not amuse the private business companies nor The United States, nor their allied governments (or the "friends" of President Bush).

    The recent events at Venezuela show that even if a government counts with the total authority to implement a deep transformation process, these transformations should be accepted by all of the sectors involved, otherwise those measures could  not be considered as a viable option. In the same way, the return of Chavez to the country's administration shows up to what point the media can present a distorted image of reality: differently from the image made up by the media, Chavez is not the object of a "massive hate", but the object of a considerable amount of support from different important social sectors, concentrated among the impoverished sectors and the lower middle class.

     The "new left-wing" as well as the extreme right-wing still have to learn some lessons; however, the main challenge is still the harmonization of the social transformation objectives with the free market and the free business companies in a democratic frame, something very difficult to achieve in a polarized scenery, where the interests and the exaggerated ambitions turn into an almost insuperable obstacle for the social change.
 
 

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