A certain lack of stature

The arena campaign: something different?

The Peace Accords seven years later

A CERTAIN LACK OF STATURE 

The political parties of El Salvador entered into an agreement to commit themselves to an electoral campaign of some moral and political stature and, until now, they have complied with this commitment in good degree, with the exception of some few incidents, which are becoming more and more frequent as the elections approach. These incidents, which have ended in blows, are the result of actions by ARENA and the FMLN. The political parties have taken their commitment so seriously that they neither insult each other nor do they question or challenge the discourse of their opponents. Each party enunciates from its own podium what its promises for government are, and no one casts doubts or aspersions on them. The news media limits itself simply to reproducing the candidate’s declarations. It would seem that the politicians are confused with regard to the nature of the discussion, as if they may not —in order to maintain good form— offer discussion or rebuttals to what others affirm. The country’s politicians have thus elevated the stature of the electoral campaign to such a height that they have lost contact with the primary reality of the country.

It would seem that those of us —institutions and organizations— who are not part of the political class are not covered by the "gentleman’s" agreement which would, had this been the case, oblige the political parties to behave themselves towards us in a civilized manner. The avalanche of insults which has fallen on the UCA and its authorities in recent days is proof of this. The reason for the political parties anger against the UCA is that the results of the most recent opinion poll of the University Institute on Public Opinion (IUDOP) were not to their liking. That they had this reaction is nothing new, given that something similar happened when the UCA presented the results of their previous poll in October of 1998. But this time the attack was more intense and irrational. In reality, during the time that the UCA has conducted electoral polls, the loser has always reacted in the same way: whether they are from the right, from the left or from the center has made no difference. The winner, on the other hand, never questions the integrity of the poll or of the UCA itself. The difference between this and other electoral campaigns is that in the present campaign not only the principal loser has reacted in such an inordinate manner, but the smaller parties, with aspirations greater than their political reality would seem to warrant, have reacted in like manner.

The attacks of the politicians reflect their frustration because social reality, which was examined and reflected in the results of the poll, does not match their expectations. The small parties dream that they are large parties and one of the large parties allowed itself the illusion that its position was a solid one. Their candidates see themselves as popular leaders born and recognized as such when they are only recently arrived in politics and, in practice, are unknown to public opinion. This does not mean that the official party would have reacted differently from the rest if the results of the poll had not favored it. During the 1997 elections, their reaction was very similar to that of those who now appear as losers.

Instead of asking themselves if, in the results of the poll, there existed a political reality which should have been taken into account and assuming that reality in order to make it into an opportunity, these politicians sought explanations where there are none to be had. They attribute to the UCA, non-existent conspiracies , a loss of independence, a change in loyalties, a rejection of specific candidates, fear of placing its prestige in danger, personal defects, institutional failings, the lack of prestige of higher education, allegations that the instrument used for measuring was inadequate, etc.: all of this they attribute to the UCA. Any pretext is good enough if it allows them not to confront reality as it is.

The San Salvador daily, EL DIARIO DE HOY, a newspaper with pretensions to objectivity and modernity, has joined the chorus. Paradoxically, it did not cover the press conference, nor did it pick up the data from the poll. But this stopped them not at all from engaging in a vicious and underhanded attack. This kind of journalistic behavior is not new to EL DIARIO DE HOY; it is the same behavior they used during the 1970´s and 1980´s to deal with national problems and, in particular, with the UCA and its authorities during the time who are now martyrs. Doubtless, the leadership of that newspaper finds that its electoral hopes are being cut off.

Salvadoran politicians live in a world separate and alien from El Salvador’s reality. They not only ignore the real problems of the population and are insensible to their suffering, but they also turn a blind eye to the political reality of the country, with which, given their vocation, they ought to be more familiar. In order to climb to political heights, they must first descend to the hard social reality of the popular majorities. It is very difficult for the great majorities of the population to identify with leaders which are divorced from and alien from daily life. Electoral campaigns are not to be improvised. The acceptance of the candidacies does not only depend on the will of the politicians nor upon the image which they have of themselves, nor upon their personal ambitions. Foreign advisors on marketing, communications and publicity cannot project credible images nor launch credible messages without basing themselves in concrete reality. The majority of the presidential candidates suffer from excessive voluntarism and ambition together with very little realism.

Politicians ought not to be surprised, then, at the reaction of the citizenry —or, of civil society as they like to call it—, given that they do not take it seriously, nor do they respect it. Their insults and their absurd explanations of the phenomenon reflect their frustration because the electorate does not respond positively to their plans. They have underestimated the intelligence and understanding that the Salvadoran people have of the reality of this country.

If it were the case that the analyses of the UCA polls are a result of conspiracies or manipulations, or that they respond only to the preferences of UCA authorities, why should these politicians be so upset? If the results of the polls are so irrelevant for the unfolding of the electoral campaign, why are they venting so much spleen? If the politicians are prepared to assume the Presidency of the Republic, why do they react with insults to the questioning which public opinion makes of them? In reality, the political parties know perfectly well that in the results of the UCA poll there is more truth than they would care to recognize. Those who are not of sufficient stature to deal with the needs and aspirations of the Salvadoran people are the political parties; given this, neither, then, are they of sufficient stature for the office to which they aspire.

THE ARENA CAMPAIGN: SOMETHING DIFFERENT? 

If anything has characterized ARENA during the last ten years during which it has held power —that is, over and above its lack of willingness to respond to the most pressing problems of the country, it is the overwhelming arrogance of the conception of which its leaders and party members hold of their party There seems not to be an ARENA member who does not consider his or her party the best, the one most appropriate for everything and the only one capable of holding the reins of destiny in El Salvador. As a result, the administration inside of a small dose of the ability of look at oneself critically has been impossible for the government party to accept..

Only its defeat ARENA suffered in the 1997 elections made it possible for ARENA to become aware of the necessity to reformulate its positions and its attitude with respect to public opinion. Nevertheless, the lesson of the 97 elections did not impress ARENA leaders sufficiently . It may well be true that at that point in time ARENA recognized that it had to change internally, the only changes which they were disposed to implement was changing the makeup of the National Executive Committee (COENA) and the naming of Mr. Alfredo Cristiani to the presidency of the party.

One cannot but recognize that the victory of the FMLN in the electoral race was assumed by ARENA with relative humility. Even some of the most representative figures of the governing party mentioned on more than one occasion the importance of being humble. But to date none of this as been in evidence in the ARENA party. The change of attitude which was truly expected after the elections never came to pass.

The ARENA leadership was very much mistaken if it thought that by changing the structure of the institution of which it was so proud meant only filling up the leadership body with new faces and placing the increasingly weakened Cristiani at the helm and naming a presidential candidate with an ostensible moderate image. None of this has made ARENA anything other than what it has always been: a party interested in governing to satisfy the economic interests of those who make it up and which is willing to risk all in order to comply with its objectives —for all the rest, coincident in nothing with the needs of the nation.

Clear demonstrations of this are the order of the day in the current electoral campaign. In the first place, one might take note of the dead-end project of installing electrical lighting of the freeway to Comalapa. On this point, a journalistic investigation held by EL DIARIO DE HOY made it clear that the amount of money which the government of Calderón Sol had earmarked for the project of lighting up the freeway to the airport was outrageous. In fact, it bore no resemblance to the real cost of the work to be carried out. It is not difficult to figure out where the funds re-routed from the project would go, especially if one takes into account the ability which the ARENA administration’s ability to take advantage of state resources for the benefit of its party.

In this sense, then, one might recall, first of all, the millionaire campaign against the FMLN financed in response to a direct executive order to use funds of the Education Ministry and carried out precisely as the pre-electoral period began last year. Another instance is the incessant propaganda that, at the drop of a hat, the President of the Republic sets into motion; take, for example, the practice of the government in using the installation of an aqueduct or the inauguration of a city park, following the criteria of this government, as the occasion for innumerable paid ads in various news media. And lastly, as a third instance, the crude political manipulative opportunism that characterized Calderón Sol and wife as they passed out international donations for those whom the hurricane "Mitch" had made homeless.

Another point which should not escape our notice is the participation of the employees of the National Center for Registration (CNR, for its initials in Spanish), during working hours, at the first ARENA meeting in San Salvador. The event would not have taken on such importance had it not been for the fact that public officials who, with the unstinting support of their supervisors in the Ministry of Justice, took the afternoon off to participate in this proselytizing event for the party. Taking note of this in some of his recent statements, the magistrate of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE, for its initials in Spenish), Mr. Félix Ulloa made a point of the fact that the electoral laws contemplate the possible annulment of a political party’s accreditation if it can be proved that the party has used any news media which falls under the aegis of state administration for its own propaganda purposes.

The embarrassment which ARENA presidential candidate Francisco Flores expressed that he felt over this event sufficed for the TSE to decide to forget the whole thing. This is also what they did with the charges pressed by the FMLN against the government party for using FMLN banners on its leaflets. LAs one might have expected, the TSE ruled in favor of ARENA in that case and declared that the leaflet did not constitute propaganda and, therefore, did not violate electoral laws. As the 1997 electoral process made clear —together with the unconditional support which it has given to the PDC in recent years—, in the TSE the scales seem always to tip in favor of ARENA.

A third and last point is that one must take note of the systematic resistance to participating in a public debate with his political opponents which "Paco" Flores has exhibited . The most questionable point in his refusal are the motives which Flores uses to justify this stance. Here is a sampling of the very excuses used: that it is still not clear which is the second political force in the country, that none of the other parties has yet presented its governmental platform, that he has to finish presenting his platform before accepting invitations to debate, that debates are a waste of time...

After so many and such disparate arguments, it is not possible to be precisely clear what Flores true motives are in so obstinately resisting participation in public debate. What can, however, be seen clearly enough is the ARENA candidate’s attitude. This proves him to be just one more of the insufferably arrogant leaders of his party. Before the campaign began, ARENA began to sell Flores as the most conciliatory and well-read of all possible candidates. It was to be expected, then, that in the course of the campaign the now popular "Paquito" might show some sign of his much-touted virtues. Much to the surprise of all, however, Flores has steadfastly refused any and all proposals to debate —even those coming from important universities and business associations.

How, then, might it be proven that Francisco Flores is the accomplished adept at dialogue and consensus-building that he purports to be if he is not willing to exchange ideas with the rest of the candidates? Why does he so resolutely reject opportunities to debate if he is such an intellectual as the ARENA campaign would make him out to be? Or is it precisely because of that intellectual background that he can afford to allow himself the luxury of belittling his opponents and give it out that none of them is worthy of such an honor? These are some of the questions one might wish to ask "Paco".

If such is the situation, then, it would be difficult to be sure that ARENA has made any substantial changes inside its party. It is worth reiterating certain factors already mentioned on previous occasions: that the current success of the government party in the electoral race is not owing to the fact that that party has significantly improved and is now committed to the real state of affairs in the country. That this is owing, to nothing other than the absence of political adversaries capable of overcoming the apathy of the voting populace towards politics and of presenting itself as a credible alternative to this body of voters, on the one hand, and, on the other, the monstrous publicity machinery which ARENA has constructed with the funds of the national treasury, respecting neither legality nor the minimum of decorum in the eyes of the Salvadoran population.

THE PEACE ACCORDS SEVEN YEARS LATER 

Economic and social matters were one of the most important and hopeful components of the peace agreements signed between the government and the FMLN. Diverse aspects which dealt with diverse topics were considered during that period. Some of these concerns were the distribution of land, the alleviation of the adjustment measures, the democratization of credits, the social and economic forum, the national reconstruction plan. Now more than seven years have passed since the signing of the peace accords, a review of compliance on economic and social matters reveals a severe deficit —with the exception of the national reconstruction plan.

Although the government and the international community took the necessary measures for complying with the accords on the agrarian question and on the question of the national reconstruction plan, topics related to economic and social matters were neglected, even those which touched the agricultural and livestock sector itself. Moreover, important doubts persist about the possibility that all lands larger in size than 245 hectares —the limit established in the accords as the limit on property size.

In the current context of the increasing reduction of growth rates together with the contribution which the agricultural and livestock sector makes to the Gross national Product, the deepening of rural poverty and the privatizations, it may be opportune to look again at the peace accords as they deal with social and economic matters because the accords themselves contemplate measures which would mitigate the effects of the contraction of the economy and of agriculture and lay the foundations for robust and sustainable growth in that sector in which exist the greatest number of poor people.

The topic of agriculture is taken up in the peace accords from the perspective of the necessity to redistribute among the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform lands which exceed 245 hectares and state lands which were not forest reserves. Even the government committed itself "to be vigilant that the application of a constitutional mandate not evaded by the owners of rural lands exceeding the limits set".

According to a report presented recently to the United Nations by the international human rights organization FIAN, evidence exists that "the government of El Salvador, through the Salvadoran Institute for Agrarian Transformation (ISTA, for its initials in Spanish) has been the major obstacle in the implementation of the first paragraph of the chapter on agriculture in the peace accords". The passage cited refers to the transference of lands. According to the same source, "on numerous occasions, ISTA tried to slow down or impede the process of investigation and adjudication of lands exceeding the limits" (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, January 18, 1998, p. 14).

Continuing on the topic of agriculture, the accords also contemplate the assignment of credits which would satisfy the demand of the "agricultural and livestock sector in general, and, especially, the demands of the very small and small businesses and small peasant production, including cooperatives of the reformed and non-reformed sector". Moreover, it was contemplated that the government would design and execute new technical assistance programs for the peasant sector. In practice, what has been observed is precisely the contrary: the agricultural and livestock sector is more and more marginalized from the assignment of credits and is growing at rates clearly inferior to the average of all other sectors (PROCESO, 743, 757, 790, 805 and 822).

Measures for alleviating "the cost of structural adjustment programs" consisted in measures such as: the adoption of a law for the protection of the consumer, the creation of an "Ombudsman’s Office for the Defense of the Consumer", the encouragement of social participation in the properties to be privatized and the adoption of social compensation programs for the alleviation of extreme poverty.

The legal and institutional aspects of the protection of the consumer have been complied with almost in their totality because there is now a Law for the Protection of the Consumer and, although an ombudsman’s office still does not exist, there is the General Office for the Protection of the Consumer. Lamentably, in practice, protection of the consumer is still very far from becoming a reality because the same historical anomalies continue to be documented, to wit: manipulation of weights and measures, circulation of medicines harmful to health, price speculation, deficient information on the real contents of products, etc.

Social participation in private enterprise, on the other hand, is not significant in the financial system, nor is it in activities for the distribution of electrical energy nor in telecommunications nor in the pension system. At most the workers in the former state distributors of electrical energy have been permitted to participate in the buying of 20% of the shares; on the other hand, in the case of the bank, it is unknown if even the original assignment of 20% for small investors has been respected given that, at the level of the Legislative Assembly, anomalies in the process of the buying and selling of shares were made known. Neither has social compensation been practiced by the government in the correct way because the budgets for public health and education have been experiencing ups and downs which do not permit them to go beyond 18% of the total national budget.

The social and economic consensus forum is the clearest demonstration of the failure of the accords to seek to change the course of economic and social policies. This forum was originally begun with the participation of representatives of the government and workers, because private enterprise refused to incorporate into the forum during the first four months. In reality, this forum did not arise from any minimum accord tending towards consensus in the formulation of public policies. It and was finally dissolved by the conditions imposed by representatives of private enterprise and the government (PROCESO 514, 530, 543, 558, 588, 621 and 628). So it is that topics of major importance such as compliance with the accords wee left almost entirely out of the discussion.

Aspects such as the increasing number of privatizations, the crisis in the agricultural and livestock sector and the stagnation of social spending suggest the need to look again at the peace accords and demand compliance by the government, upon whom principally depends the completion of all of its provisions, at least on questions of public policies. In this context, some important tasks are the verification and distribution of properties greater than 245 hectares, the design of credit and technical assistance programs for the agricultural and livestock sector in general, the strengthening of institutions for the protection of the consumer, democratization of THE property of businesses which are still not privatized and an increase in social spending on health, education and social compensation programs.