Proceso, 825

October 7, 1998

 

 

Editorial

Mar'x contribution to the study of violence

Politics

A new christian democratic party?

Economy

Crisis in the coffee-producing sector

News Briefs

 

 

EDITORIAL

 

MARX’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF VIOLENCE

If we start from the premise that the theoretical effort of Karl Marx was dominated by a scientific vision, we ought, also, to be disposed to accept, now, one hundred years after his death, the need to review his sociological, economic, historical and political legacy. This evaluation ought to be focussed on discerning which of Marx’s contributions which still enjoy the potential for explanation of social reality and which have lost that potential, or, at least, ought to be re-examined in the light of the contributions of contemporary social science.

In the matter of the problem of violence, the theoretical contribution of Marx is, in some of its aspects, of great analytical relevance. In the first place, his conception of structural violence, its origin and its perverse mechanisms, is a contribution of great value for the analysis of contemporary Latin American and African societies. The diverse conceptual approximations to the problem of socio-economical marginalization which are currently being presented, and to the scientific objectives to which there can be no objections, can be consigned to Marx’s thesis concerning the topic of structural violence.

In the second place, Marx, as few others, knew how to draw out the sense and the mechanisms of political violence the relevance of which, in the dynamics of capitalist societies, since the last century up until well into the twentieth century, is undeniable. In Latin America, beginning at the end of the twentieth century until the end of the decade of the 1980’s, this kind of violence, as much in its state and paramilitary character as in its responsive and popular character, was the central axis of political dynamics. Even, in good measure because of the influence of the Marxist vision, the idea of the "spiral of violence" came to be formulated. It is from this idea that the following sequential progression springs: (original) structural violenceè popular violence of resistanceè institutional violence (of the state)è organized violence (popular)è generalized state repression and state terrorism. It was almost impossible to achieve a medium-clear understanding of Latin American social reality —marked as it is by authoritarian political regimes, economies which excluded the majority of the population and radical social movements— without taking into account the logic of violence which ruled and guided it.

In the third place, in the Marxist treatment of violence, its instrumental dimension becomes relevant: violence serves to achieve determinate goals, be these economic or political; that is to say, it serves as the medium for achieving determinate ends. It is not irrelevant for the social sciences that Marx highlighted this dimension of violence and, even more, that he succeeded in establishing determinate types of violence which can be characterized by their instrumentality. This analytical perspective is a valuable tool in contemporary studies of violence, which have permitted the identification of many more kinds of instrumental violence than those contemplated by Marx— which are, in the great majority of cases, limited to the individual sphere.

In fourth place, Marx highlighted the objective character of violence. As a result , violence is not something which is subject the human will alone, given that it has a reality beyond this: in the economic basis as well as in the judicial-political superstructure. Under capitalism, Marx teaches us, individuals must live with violence and its functional mechanisms together until they arrive at the "kingdom of liberty". One must live with the violence exercised by the dominant classes, by means of economy and politics and the violence that the underlying classes exercise in order to resist the violence of the first and prepare for the advent of a society without violence.

On a last point, together with the idea of the objectivity of violence, Marx highlights that it is unavoidable for men and women to live with violence, as long as societies are divided into classes. If we do not allow ourselves to be carried away by the optimism of Marx so that we assume that the idyllic society which he proposes to us can be achieved only with great difficulty at any particular moment in the history of humanity, we then come to the conclusion that violence will never be eradicated from social cohabitation. That is to say that human beings will have to learn to live, now as in the past, with violence not as something accidental, but as something inscribed on the social structure and fabric. If one suppresses the utopic element in Marx, his premise on violence becomes coherent with other social theories, for which violence is an ineradicable and irreducible component in the social life of man.

Finally, the previously mentioned aspects are part of a theoretical legacy of Marxism necessary for the comprehension of the phenomenon of violence. It is a question, moreover, of a partial contribution, inasmuch as Marx himself lays to one side dimensions of violence which were explored by other intellectual traditions.

In reality, an examination of diverse manifestations of violence, more specific than those contemplated in class relationships, reveals that in many of them it was almost impossible to establish the economic and political component by means of which they adhered to the conceptual provenance of Marxist contexts. Likewise, a broad range of classes of violence are contained in spheres of microsocial relationships in which individual action-interaction comes to represent a preponderance which cannot be ignored. Moreover, in that microsocial sphere, from time to time, it is relatively easy to characterize a violent act as instrumental, but at various points in time this characterization is totally impossible because it does not appear anywhere in the relationship means-end which is part of the logical instrument.

The foregoing has provided guidelines for reviewing the corpus of Marxist theory, with the objective of reconsidering some of its supposed basic assumptions and provide it with new analytic tools (as analytic Marxism itself, does, for example), with the objective of recovering dimensions of human reality (instinct-emotion) which the Marxist tradition deals with insufficiently. In this way the review of the Marxist legacy on the question of violence can proceed.

 

 

POLITICS

 

A NEW CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY?

On Wednesday, October 7, the San Salvador morning daily EL DIARIO DE HOY published an analysis entitled "The ‘Old Guard’. The ‘Dark Green" Past of the PDC". To enumerate the numberless errors committed by the PDC group during its executive administration of 1984-1989 was, by all accounts, the intention of that article. Economic instability, a sharpening of the social crisis and an open deterioration in the institutionality of the party were, according to the words of the newspaper’s analyst, the result of mistaken methods of political administration implanted and used by the PDC. That, together with the scandalous levels of corruption which predominated during that period, converted the Christian Democratic government into a sickness which seriously attacked the country, the symptoms and repercussions of which the population is still suffering.

The writers of this analysis affirm, moreover, that the "new political class", with Ronal Umaña at its head, has given a new fresh reality to the party, "rescuing" what little was left of it "Umaña is exempt from guilt for the damage caused by the PDC administration of the "Old Guard", declared the newspaper; to which it adds praise for the current secretary of the PDC for the incorporation of the presidential candidate, Mr. Rodolfo Parker, into the rank and file of that political institution. With that, Mr. Umaña would have "succeeded in increasing the prestige of the party" will have "renewed the interest of diverse sectors of society in Christian Democracy".

It was a question, then, of sustaining the idea —using facts as a basis and revealing, without standing on ceremony, or stopping to name calling, that if it is true that the old PDC had brought ruin as much to the country as to the party itself, "the new political class", under the leadership of its committed, clean and visionary leader, who heard the call to convert himself into the savior of Christian Democracy. In conclusion: Ronal Umaña and his allies are a synonym for renovation and openness; their entrance into the PDC rank and file constitutes the only opportunity for the reconstruction of the party. Their incorporation, therefore, into the rank and file of the party is only a little less than providential. If the kingdom of the old guard brought only disaster and decadence, Mr. Umaña is now the PDC’s open door to a new future and a promising horizon.

The next day, October 8, EL DIARIO DE HOY dedicated a column to excusing itself to those who, the day before, had figured in its pages as the most corrupt politicians of the last ten years. The newspaper’s editors argued that the PDC functionaries had not been brought to trial for fraudulent handling of funds, nor in the trials which actually took place, had a final verdict been reached. It stated, moreover, that the facts presented corresponded only to the versions presented by those who wished to defame the PDC or to the documentation published during that epoch. To bring accusations to bear against the older members of the PDC had been, then, incorrect because the information which had been made against their respective administrations was either biased or incomplete. The article ends by offering —very courteously— space in the paper’s pages so that those affected could make their own version public concerning the events of past times.

The newspapers manner of proceeding is more than a little suspicious. First of all, it dedicates two complete pages to pointing out the errors of Christian Democracy during the period of its term in office and directs itself without hesitation against all of those involved in that administration and then decides to forget all about the matter by publishing a small column in which it briefly explains the paper’s "error" and urges those involved to offer their own version of the facts to public opinion.

A popular saying says that "To ask forgiveness is more important than to ask permission" and that is just the spirit which EL DIARIO DE HOY has availed itself of in order to carry out this maneuver: it blackens the old PDC, accuses its older and former leaders and lays low the PDC past with the object of presenting Mr. Umaña in a bright light and applauding, at the same time, the candidacy of Mr. Rodolfo Parker. And thereafter a few amiable excuses are all that are necessary. Everything had to have been calculated beforehand. It must surely be the case that more readers informed themselves on the matter of the "dark" past of the PDC than those who might read the small note excusing themselves. In any case, what had been said against Christian Democracy could not now be retracted and —what is more important— the idea that Ronal Umaña is the salvation of the party remained intact.

What might be the DIARIO de HOY’s interest in so openly supporting Mr. Umaña? This is a question which immediately surges to the fore when one examines the declarations of its analysts with any care at all. It is well known that some stalwart ARENA party members who are now embattled detractors of the current government, belong to the editorial board of that newspaper. Various of these same persons have formed a grouping named "The Friends of Liberty"; a grouping, for all the rest, of confusing composition, but with clear and manifest political interests. It is also a well-known fact that it was precisely these same members of "The Friends of Liberty" —to wit, Alfredo Mena Lagos and Orlando De Sola, among others— who proposed Mr. Parker’s candidacy to the PDC.

It is not difficult, then, to tie up the loose ends. All seems to indicate that "The Amigos", highly interested in participating actively in the political life of the country, have found in the PDC a very convenient party tool. Mr. Umaña, the classic opportunist positioned to make deals with whoever in order to traffic in quotas of power, will surely have no problems in following the dictates of this new grouping. For their part, the allies of liberty, dedicate themselves to their own affairs: exercising political influence in favor of their own interests, undermining the strength of ARENA and initiating a serious competition against that party.

So now, there is an element that does not fit into this hypothesis and it is that the PDC has been especially unconditional with ARENA since Mr. Umaña has headed up that party. It is here that the thesis that Mr. Alfredo Cristiani and his group —not happy with the predominance of Mr. Calderón Sol’s wing of the party and resistant to accepting the candidacy of Mr. Francisco Flores— have contributed to encouraging the candidacy of Mr. Parker with the objective of counteracting Mr. Flores’ candidacy and of taking back the hegemony of ARENA.

From the perspective of this explanation one can understand the reason for the sudden publication of EL DIARIO DE HOY: certain groups attempt to confront those who, at this point in time, have the power in ARENA use the PDC party structure as well as the prestige of the newspaper to take control of it. Only in this modus operandi could it so blindly defend —in a newspaper which aims to be serious— such a dark figure as Mr. Ronal Umaña. Because, of course, it is true that Mr. Umaña cannot be held responsible for the governmental administration of the old guard, we would miss the mark entirely if we were to exculpate him from the current situation of his party.

Two conclusions may be drawn from all of this. The first is that, in spite of the unanimous songs of jubilation in celebration of freedom of the press and journalistic objectivity, some of the most important communication media in the country continue to be at the service of the most doubtful political interests. And the second conclusion is that, if it is true —and there is no reason to deny it— that the old guard PDC members dirtied their hands with state funds and damaged the country during the last years of the past decade, it is also true that there is nothing in the PDC of today that exhibits proof that anything has changed in the interior of the party nor indicates that its leaders are now different from its previous leaders.

 

 

ECONOMY

 

CRISIS IN THE COFFEE-PRODUCING SECTOR

Since the moment it became a principal agricultural crop, coffee has gone through different periods of crisis and recuperation, and these were determined principally by the international prices of coffee. There are three emblematic cases: the fall in prices which occurred during the decade of the 1930’s as a result of the world economic crisis; the crisis of the mid-1970’s, and the most recent —and most serious— crisis which began in 1989 with the dissolution of the International Organization for Coffee (OIC, for its initials in Spanish).

During the last two years, the crisis of the coffee-producing sector has been sharpening, motivated by the most diverse exigencies for sinecures and sectorial measures presented by the coffee-producing guilds to the government administrations in office. Although in appearance, the coffee-producing sector is not receiving attention, what is certain is that the current government party is made up, in its majority, of medium-sized and big coffee producers of the country, to the degree that ex-President Alfredo Cristiani as well as the current President, Armando Calderón Sol, belong to families with strong interests in this sector. Others can be found in positions of relative political importance, as much in the executive as in the legislative branch. In the executive branch, Mr. Mario Acosta, Minister of the Interior, and Mr. Ricardo Quiñonez, Minister of Agriculture and Livestock, are outstanding figures.

The most frequently heard complaints are those expressed by the Coffee-Producers’ Association of El Salvador, which solicits for itself the most varied measures: from plans for police protection for transport of harvests to a political economy designed especially for the stimulation of coffee production. In this context, it is useful to review the content of measures, so that afterwards one can reflect on the causes of the crisis of the coffee-growing sector and its implications for the national economy.

It is noteworthy that, although members of the coffee-growing sector have an important quota of power in the government, they have not been able to make viable the adoption of measures for its reactivation. The interpretations of the producers are varied and, in their majority, see in the problematic situation of coffee only an endogenous origin, ignoring the determining international context as a reflection of declarations in recent publications of the written press. So it is that the Minister of the Interior sustains that the crisis of coffee cultivation "has its origin precisely in the agrarian reform, which presented a situation in which coffee, after it had become an extensive production [crop] became an intensive [crop as well]." Moreover, the Ministry maintains that the agrarian reform was a failure because "we became a small landowners’ country which did not have the capability of producing crops which need large land areas. This is linked with the absurd constitutional [provision] of land holding [which limits it]".

For his part, the Minister of Agriculture affirms that "there is no decision" by the government that "we [the coffee growers] will be denied or inhibited by the economic policies of the state", in spite of the fact that "the greatest needs are in that sector, which we have called ‘the poorest of the poor’ ". Synchronized with such a focus, the President of the Coffee-Producers’ Association of El Salvador, Ms. Elena Bolaños de Arriaza, stated that "as the coffee-producers receive no incentives and, given the fall in prices, there is no disposition [on their part] to continue running risks…. They ought to give them credits in the long run, so that they can move forward, as they did during the years 1992 and 1993".

The agrarian reform of 1980, for example, cannot be mentioned as a cause of the debacle suffered by this sector, given that it did not affect properties of between 150 and 500 hectares [land measurement], which is where close to 70% of the coffee-producing ventures are located. Of course it did affect some coffee-producing haciendas, but these continue producing coffee now that they are in the hands of the cooperative beneficiaries.

The idea that there is an absence of policies for the sector is very much open to discussion, above all if one considers that the coffee-producers represent only a small proportion of the national population and that these same producers are owners of the major part of the value added portion of production.

The coffee-producers have availed themselves of the support provided by state policies since coffee appeared as the mainstay of capitalist accumulation in the country, which made the expropriation of common lands and ejidos located in the central zone of the country indispensable. More recently, the policies of the government of Mr. Alfredo Cristiani came to the fore and this meant the elimination of the tax on the exportation of coffee and created special lines of credit for the sector, as was pointed out above.

Still more questionable is the fact that this crop —although it is noted to be "the salvation of the environment’, a source of temporary and permanent employment, production and exports— has brought with it the overall result of generalized impoverishment among the rural population. First of all because the introduction of coffee separated the rural population from its lands, but not as a result of the current coffee crisis, but because of structural reasons.

Employment in coffee harvesting only lasts for four months out of the year and obliges the rural workers to dedicate themselves during the greater part of the year to typically peasant activities. Additionally, the salaries of the workers in the coffee sector have confined them to extreme poverty since the beginning harvests of this crop up through the present time. According to official data, the value of the basic food basket which defines the limit of extreme poverty was, for the month of September of this year, 2,223 colones, while the minimum salary of the coffee sector does not amount to even 1,000 colones.

The fundamental explanation of the current crisis in the coffee sector is the sudden fall in the international prices for coffee which occurred after the disintegration of the OIC. At this point in time alone, the prices fell from 123 to 85 dollars per quintal and since then have continued to oscillate around 100. Although they exhibit sporadic recuperation, there is a clear downward tendency. In the first few days of the month of October of 1998, after a recuperation, the prices stayed constant near 110 dollars per quintal.

The implications of government non-intervention in favor of the coffee-producing sector can be varied and serious: the fall in production and export, lower levels of temporary employment in the rural sector, a loss in artificial forests in which coffee crops are sown and sheltered, etc. Nevertheless, in the current international context, the need to seek alternatives to agricultural production will be imposed and these benefits can be shared in a more equitable manner than coffee and can represent, as well, a viable alternative from the ecological perspective. The foregoing does not imply that what is being proposed is the disappearance of coffee production, but one cannot but notice that the crisis in coffee production is a clear signal that the changes in the world market are of such magnitude that one is obliged to propose consequential changes in the products which are to be offered on the world market.

 

 

NEWS BRIEFS

 

ACCORD. Representatives of the Municipality of San Salvador and small salespersons working throughout the downtown center of the capital city agreed, on October 7, to hold back plans for eviction which had been proposed for a period of time amounting to 48 hours so that possible solutions with regard to this situation could be discussed. The accord was reached after the diverse trade union guilds of street vendors carried out a protest action in different streets of the capital city, obstructing traffic during the whole of the morning. A commission of street vendors made up of the president of the National Association of Workers, Vendors and Small Commercial Sellers and Similar Workers (ANTRAVEPECOS, for its initials in Spanish), Mr. Vicente Ramirez; the coordinator of the National Association of Small Commercial Sellers and Vendors of Light Snacks (ANPECOVAL, for its initials in Spanish), Mr. Mauricio Garcia, and other leaders spoke with various council members and members of the Project for the Recuperation of the Historic Downtown Area in order to request a halt to the eviction of sidewalk sales stands. However, for the secretary of the Trade Union of Independent Workers of the Informal Business Sector (SENTIPECEAS, for its initials in Spanish), Mr. Ildefonso Castillo, the negotiations did not give reason for much confidence because by means of the negotiations the definitive eviction will not be detained, even though this is one of the points on the list of demands presented by the vendors. According to unofficial reports, some ex-civil defense agents and civil patrol agents participated (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, October 8, p. 4).

 

FIREARMS. The approval of the new Law for the Control of Firearms, Munitions and Explosives continues at a stalemate after a week of discussions among the political factions of the Legislative Assembly. One of the principal causes for the stalemate is that which delineates the requirements which a person must comply with in order to possess or carry firearms. With regard to this point, the FMLN expressed the opinion that the ex-delinquents ought not to be qualified to possess firearms, a thesis refuted by the PCN deputies, who considered that a person, after having served a sentence, has recovered his or her rights. ARENA and the PDC, for their part, reserved their opinion on the question because they declared that they were still studying the law. Apparently, the principal fear expressed by the deputies is that the new legislation might contradict the Constitution in denying a license to those who had paid their debt to society and corrected their faults. With the new law, the legislators seek to control the possession and carrying of firearms, as well as to establish regulations necessary for their commercial sale. The Commission for the Defense solicited the opinion of the Constitutional Office of the Supreme Court and the Attorney General’s Office as well as the opinion of the Ministry of Justice on this topic, but have not received a response to date (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, October 5, p. 8).

 

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS. Members of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC, for its initials in Spanish) who oppose the current Secretary General of the PDC, Mr. Ronal Umaña, convoked, on October 4, a national convention but did not specify the date, in order to elect and discuss a possible new leadership body. Mr. Roque Feler Melgar, Adjunct Secretary General for Usulután, said that the Umaña administration and the term of office of the Political Commission ends on November 30 of this year and, therefore, before that date, the persons who will substitute them should be defined. According to Mr. Melgar, the new leaders must possess the capability to work for the survival of the party during the 1999 elections. "We are worried about the course of the PDC. The latest polls reveal that the party includes the most widely discredited politicians. At the level of [electoral] preferences it is esteemed that the PDC could not [receive] five per cent [of the votes]", the Adjunct Secretary argued. According to Mr. Melgar’s declarations, any PDC member can be a candidate for general secretary or member of the political commission. "Ronal Umaña can participate, ‘the old guard’ and the Movement for Unification. If Ronal participates and wins, he will have our respect and support", he stated. In this sense, Mr. Umaña disapproved of the intention to renew the party leadership. "No comment. Well…they’re crazy", he commented, although he recognized that the change must take place in November (EL DIARIO DE HOY, October 5, p. 6).

 

FUSADES. By means of an analytical presentation, the Salvadoran Foundation for Development (FUSADES) confirmed the problems that the new Law Governing Free-Trade Zones confronts the provisions offered in international trade treaties. Nevertheless, FUSADES did not take seriously some of the problems and said that the new legislation would be beneficial for the country. The most problematic points are the possible violations of the rules of the World Trade Organization (OMC, for its initials in Spanish) as well as Central American integration treaties. Such is the case of tax exemptions on imported products and exemptions for export items bound for Central America, as well as exemptions for all businesses inside free-trade zones as well as the requirement that 50% of the raw material content for textile producers who benefit from the sale of their product inside the country. Nevertheless, all those arguments, which were presented some weeks ago by the Ministry of Agriculture, the Chamber of Commerce for Agriculture and Livestock (CAMAGRO, for its initials in Spanish) and the Sugar Producers Association, were confronted by FUSADES, especially with regard to the treaty violations arising from Central American integration treaties, as they are provided with subsidies on exports destined for the Central American isthmus. In spite of the fact that the Fondation still has not made an official pronouncement in this regard, it is hoped that it will do so after the presentation of the two analyses: one legal and the other economic (EL DIARIO DE HOY, October 3, p. 36).

 

VENDORS. More than a hundred street vendors were evicted from the Central Markeplace on October 2, a place where they had set up their stalls for years. They protested some hours later while they tried to take the area by force. The street vendors tried to push the door to the parking lot down and insulted police and journalists whom they accused of having "sold out" to the municipal authorities. The venders were arrested by a line of police agents belonging to the Order Maintenance Unit (UMO, for its initials in Spanish). The agents acted by kicking and showering pepper gas on the demonstrators. Given this situation, the General Manager of the Market, Mr. Ismael Merlos, explained that the eviction of the vendors’ stalls is the first step in a project which seeks to root out the informal commerce in the areas surrounding the place. The expulsion was a "decision of the market administration, the municipality and a long-standing petition by the people [who sell inside] the market", stated Mr. Merlos. (EL DIARIO DE HOY, October 3, p. 20).

 

INDEMNIZATIONS. Mr. Jaime Guzmán Morales, Minister of Defense, stated, on October 1, that only some 5,000 civil patrol agents—of the 25,000 who allege that they are—will receive benefits with a payment of a pension of 300 colones per month. Nevertheless, the ex-civil patrol agents of the Armed Forces are claiming 18,000 colones each one, and for this reason rejected the offer of the President of the Republic, Armando Calderón Sol. According to Decree 550 of the Revolutionary Governmental Junta, emitted in 1980, the civil patrol and civil defense agents ought to receive a pension of 40 colones per month. However, this was increased in 1989 by the Legislative Assembly to 300 colones. In order to obtain this remuneration, these ex-paramilitary personnel must have completed 20 years of service and have reach the age of 45 years. The decree also benefits the wives of ex-paramilitary personnel who died in combat as well as those who were disabled "in territorial service activities", stated the Minister. With regard to those ex-civil patrol agents who will not receive benefits, Mr. Guzmán Morales explained that "at this moment…nothing can be done [for them]". For its part, the PCN requested that the Legislative Assembly give approval to a decree which would provide pensions and indemnifications which depended upon the length of time served and the degree of danger in the zone where the ex-paramilitary agents were engaged in combat (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, October 2, p. 22).