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Proceso 1183
March 1, 2006
ISSN 0259-9864
Editorial: The "Saca effect" and the "Schafik effect"
Politics: ARENA's president and his visit to Washington
Economy: Considerations on the legislative proposal of PDC
The "Saca effect" and the "Schafik effect"
According to IUDOP's poll, the difference in voting intention and preference between the main parties is scarce. ARENA is just a little ahead of FMLN: seven points in preference and three in voting intention for mayor. There is no difference between them regarding their commitment to defend people's interests, one third each, which is not much. The same scarce difference and always favoring ARENA can be found among those who feel more distant and closer to each one of the two parties. PCN is in third place, so far from the other two parties, but stable. The Christian Democrats are far off and, under them, there are the rest of the parties. Now, one has not to lose sight of the fact that what the parties win or lose depends on the political and social value of all the deputies or each mayor's office in particular.
It seems that ARENA won't control Legislative Assembly, as their leaders planned
and as president Saca is asking for in every municipality. What is more probable
is that ARENA should maintain its alliance with right wing parties in order to
gain majority and could face the same problems it currently has in order to
reach qualified majority. This also means that the FMLN won't control the
legislature either. Moreover, the population does not want that any of these
parties contorl it. The difference between those who want that ARENA rule it and
those who want that FMLN do the same is only four points favoring ARENA. So,
president Saca is not able to sweep out the country, as he did during the
presidential election. In that moment, the goal was preventing Handal to be
president, but the composition of assembly and municipalities is moved by other
dynamics.
It is quite probable that the most emblematic municipality, San Salvador, won't
be won by ARENA. The FMLN is ahead five points of ARENA, in preference and in
voting intention. That difference equals nine in the election of deputies.
Besides none of both parties is the preferred one, the capital city supports
more the FMLN than ARENA, which has been unable to reverse this situation.
FMLN's candidate is more popular than ARENA's candidate. People think that the
FMLN will win over ARENA. The half part of the people think that ARENA should
have chose a better candidate. More of the half part has already chose which
party are they going to vote for. For more than the half of them, this decision
is definitive. Unlike the national trend, in San Salvador, those who think that
the FMLN should control the Assembly predominate.
In a few words, the situation has not been favorable for ARENA, on spite that it
saturated public spaces with electoral and governmental propaganda in advance,
and on spite that president Saca was the head of the campaign. In the other
side, in a good extent, ARENA's position depends on the role of the president.
His figure and popularity sustain the party, whose candidates, in the practice,
win few votes. Undoubtedly, this direct and active participation of the
president and the governmental structure are crucial for ARENA's position in
voting intention.
Delinquency has been the most popular issue for ARENA and it still has the power
to create sympathies and attract votes, but it is starting to give signs of
exhaustion. Delinquency is in the first place of the people's concern, which
approves the "Super hard hand plan" and the change of the police director. But,
in the other hand, they understand that the presidential plan does not stop
delinquency. They neither think that ARENA's deputies will contribute to reduce
crime. People are more prone to authoritarian and repressive measures, an
inheritance of military dictatorships, and very determining for collective and
individual behavior. In this context, it is understandable that most of the
people prefer authoritarianism, or show indifference to democracy. Moreover, the
willingness of president Saca to listen to people's demands is positively
valued. But his economic measures are not attractive. Most of the people have
the perception that the president did not fulfil his promises of fighting
poverty, creating jobs and supporting single mothers. This denies that, as
ARENA's propaganda states, president Saca does fulfill his promises. These
weaknesses do not surprise in a party identified by the immense majority as the
rich man's party. Other aspects that ARENA could take advantage of them, as
their good performance in education and health, do not attract more votes for
ARENA.
President's image has invaded the propaganda of local elections in a extent that
the candidates for the assembly and local governments have disappeared. ARENA's
strategy does not leave room for their contributions. Only the president counts.
The candidates owe him what they are and whatever they could do in the case that
they were elected, will also depend on him. According to ARENA's discourse,
deputies are elected to fulfill the president's orders and the mayors' future
depends on his goodwill. But being this a local and disperse election, the
political wealth of ARENA, derived of president Saca's positive evaluation and
popularity, is diluted as it gets in touch with local political dynamics.
Finally, it is clear that the population prefer that none of the big parties
—especially ARENA— control the Legislative Assembly. The people prefer that the
Assembly make counterweight to the presidential power, which is overwhelming by
nature. President Saca and his party favor an absolutist government, but the
population favors a somewhat democratic regime. In the local government
election, besides the party and the president's image influence, they do not
influence enough. ARENA betted for president Saca's popularity, but their plans
did not succeed. For this very reason, ARENA insists more and more on the
delinquency issue, centered in gangs, which are gratuitously linked with
partisan activity. Saca's effect works, but not enough to influence in a local
election.
Facing Saca's effect there is Schafik's effect, whose death also influence the
voting intention in a perceptive way, but not because of what the FMLN's leaders
are undoubtedly thinking. The missing of the historical leader not only has
mobilized in an intense way the traditional vote for the party, but also has
attracted those who would not vote for it, due to some doubts, which disappeared
with him. In this way, the FMLN has won new and unexpected votes. In fact, two
out of three persons think that the FMLN won't radicalize itself and four out of
ten will vote after Schafik's death. Public opinion does not have any clearness
about if the party will remain united. Paradoxically, the position maintained by
ARENA during Handal's life is turning against ARENA after his death. Instead of
taking away votes for the FMLN, it is giving it more votes, motivated by the
possibility of moderation. This is just what ARENA had been demanding to the
FMLN.
Facing the predictable results of the election, ARENA is desperately seeking new
elements in order to enhance the FMLN's radicalism and extremism, but without
any apparent success. ARENA also had an irreparable loss with Handal's death,
because it does not have anymore an visible adversary to blame for the FMLN's
mistakes and their owns'. Without an adversary of Schafik's stature, ARENA's
discourse sounds voider and has fewer echoes. The FMLN has a good chance to
stress the incoherence of the citizen's security police and the failure of
ARENA's economic policy.
ARENA's president and his visit to Washington
Not being a member of ARENA is the same that not being Salvadoran. This statement is not true, but it is the implicit message, and sometimes explicit, transmitted by president Saca since he started to lead ARENA's campaign for the local and legislative elections of March 12, 2006.
On Tuesday, February 28, as a part of an ARENA's rally headed by president Saca,
he expressed the following in front of 500 inhabitants of the town of San Pedro
Perulapán: "he who stays home will fail to homeland". As the president of the
nation, Saca, paying respect to the Constitution of the country that he is
ruling, should have to abstain himself of making party proselytism. Saca is
called to motivate the population as a whole to participate in elections,
without using his position to favor his party's candidates. But, ignoring
Constitution and being "pragmatic", those who defend his actions allege that, in
front of the people of San Pedro Perulapán, he was acting as ARENA's president,
which is true and also is not. He did represent his role as ARENA's president,
but before asking his sympathizers to vote for his party, he also said: "if I
came here when I was your candidate, now being your president, how I was
supposed not to come here?" The question is: did Saca visit San Pedro Perulapán
as the ARENA's president or as the president of El Salvador? He said it clearly:
as president of the ARENA party, but mainly as the president of El Salvador.
Elías Antonio Saca, president of El Salvador, is failing to the sectors that do
not belong to ARENA and he is forgetting that he is also their president.
President Saca does not want "rocks in his path" (i. e., FMLN's deputies in the
Assembly), so he will be able to "rule in liberty". The media links any social
demonstration of unconformity, legitimate or violent, with the FMLN. All this
leads to conclude that the president of El Salvador is an authoritarian one,
intolerant with partisan and social opposition, disguised with a discourse
plenty of liberty and democracy, and supported, of course, by the main media
corporations belonging to the right wing.
Euphoria for Washington versus social dissatisfaction
The recent visit of the president of El Salvador to Washington was a media
spectacle to favor ARENA in the coming elections. Saca went for "the whole
promotional combo": the extension of the Temporary Protection Status (TPS) for
Salvadorans during one more year and the official approval of the coming to
effect of CAFTA in March 1st, being El Salvador the first country that got
"green light" to do it. The rightist media made a great song and dance about
this news, as they usually cover president Saca's "things". But this was not
all: on Monday, February 27, ARENA published in the main morning papers two
pages showing the handshake between Saca and president Bush. The ad praised the
extension of TPS as a "personal achievement·" of president Saca and asked the
people to vote for ARENA. Using this news as a way to ask for votes is something
outrageous coming from president Saca, taking into account that he is the main
chief of the media campaign and its author.
Contrasting with the enthusiasm shown by ARENA and its president, there is the
harsh social turbulence unleashed in the streets of San Salvador during this
week, specially the demonstrations of social organizations and trade unions, and
also informal vendors, against CAFTA. In some moments, these demonstrations
turned violent, due to the confrontation between some demonstrators and the
antiriot division of the police (known as UMO), which augurs a social explosion
in considerable proportions. Instead of satisfying people's demands, as the
president of the nation, Saca hurries up to blame the population itself,
accusing it of being "leftist" people with partisan purposes. Rightist media do
not hesitate in publishing his irresponsible statements, and they even draw
their own "journalistic conclusions". This week's demonstrations show that there
is social unconformity, which is faced arrogantly by president Saca, who turned
his back to the people's demands. President Saca is not acting as "the president
of all the Salvadorans" beyond the publicity he pays (with the money of all
Salvadorans) for saying so. What we have is a president of ARENA and for ARENA,
who was elected as the president of El Salvador.
Much ado about nothing
Foreign policy has a vital importance for the survival of any Central American
government in the present. It is important that the president lobbies for TPS,
for instance, but this is not an achievement that deserves pomp and applause,
because it is something temporary, a short-term measure, that was not only
achieved by president Saca, but by Central American pressure groups in the US.
In the other hand, TPS was also granted to Honduras and Nicaragua, countries
that do not send troops to Iraq in exchange for it. In foreign policy is more
important to search a permanent solution for the undocumented fellow countrymen
and women living in the US, with options that allow them stay in El Salvador and
living with dignity. One must not forget that the Chamber of Representatives in
the US passed Sensenbrenner law in December 2005, a repressive and xenophobic
project that still has to pass in the Senate and signed by president Bush before
becoming a law. In case of approval, this law would be an imminent danger for
undocumented Latinos in the US.
In the other hand, being the first country that got "green light" to start CAFTA
in the Central American region is something that can not be viewed as an
"achievement" of a negotiation in which the country defended and protected the
interests of wide social and business sectors. What is true is that the absolute
obedience to Washington of our public officers was rewarded with CAFTA. These
officers did not negotiate representing the national interests. They just agreed
with whatever Washington asked and they just made sure that the interests of the
great capital were not affected.
Saca must remember that the Constitution, which he often ignores, grants him the
direction of foreign policy favoring the interests of the country. If his
actions were coherent with the national interest, thus foreign policy would
guarantee the future for El Salvador. Today, the survival of the nations depends
on a stable and sustainable economic situation, on energy and alimentary
security. El Salvador does not have any of these three basic guarantees and
Saca's foreign policy does not go through this way. If Saca did what he has to
do to favor the country, he would deserve all the pomp he already enjoys without
working for it.
Considerations on the legislative proposal of PDC
Like in the case of the CD-FDR-PPSC coalition, the legislative platform of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) begins with a brief analysis of the current situation. For PDC, ARENA and the FMLN are responsible for the worsening of the economic, social and politic problems. Both parties had put the country "to the edge of an abyss of public insecurity, unemployment, social decomposition, economic crisis and permanent political conflicts". Christian Democrats criticizes ARENA for ruling the country "to benefit a few ones", while the FMLN often calls the population to "more struggle". In this confrontation milieu, supporting either the FMLN or ARENA equals to worsening the situation, which is not convenient for economic development.
In order to halt the conflict, PDC presents itself as the only party able to
avoid the crisis the nation is heading to. It calls itself the only constructive
opposition, able to "take away the government from ARENA without a conflict that
would make the Salvadorans suffer". According to its government platform, PDC
also considers itself as the one and only party with clear ideas to "solve the
problems of the country".
Five points "to save El Salvador"
The PDC's candidates for deputies maintain that they work platform is based in
five points: reestablish social and politic harmony; reestablish values;
citizenry tranquility, recovering neighborhoods, public transportation routes
and prisons controlled by gangs and organized crime; search of new entrepreneurs
to reactivate economy and create jobs; and, finally, improving salaries to
discourage emigration. From all these points, the latter two are centered in
economy.
In the first place, PDC's candidates propose to strengthen "new entrepreneurs"
in order to reactivate economy and create jobs. Concretely, they propose to
"legislate for generating a renewal in entrepreneurial class, that displace the
ARENA's aristocratic model, which uses the government to control market". In
this sense, Christian Democrats support "new medium entrepreneurs", that are
willing to invest in the country to create more jobs. The elected candidates
commit themselves to promote the entrepreneurial investment through fiscal
incentives, focused in marginal territories in the country, so new business
establish themselves in this zones and create more job opportunities.
The starting point seems correct, when the PDC states that the ruling party uses
the government to protect certain mercantilist interests. Some of the Executive
branch's decisions have favored an entrepreneurial group that is closely linked
to the ruling party's interests. In many occasions, the ruling party, controlled
by some prominent entrepreneurs in the country, uses the control of the
government to make businesses that produce particular benefits. These benefits
are presented as advantages for the country, because they create more jobs,
improve salaries and enhance the development of the country. This mix of
interests that involves government's officers and entrepreneurs linked to the
ruling party, does not allow to see that the national interests go beyond the
entrepreneurial issues. Obviously, these are interesting issues, but the
direction of the country can not be established over the basis of an
entrepreneurial agenda of a particular group. In few words, one has not to
confuse making country with making businesses, although this could be important
for development.
The "entrepreneurial class renewal" would be achieved, according to the PDC,
supporting the investments of micro, small and medium businesses, through fiscal
incentives. However, these incentives should be supported by other parties and
also must pass trough an analysis of public finances. In this sense, it seems so
far away that the political parties in the Assembly would be willing to give
more fiscal incentives for the investment projects, because the public finances
in the actuality can not lose any tax source in order to increase the
government's incomes. In the other hand, the "renewal of the entrepreneurial
class" would not be the result a determinate economic or politic measure, but
the result of a social process that could last many years. It is not clear the
way in which the PDC would create a new entrepreneurial class, different to that
linked with the ruling party.
Other proposal considers adjusting salaries in order to avoid emigration. PDC's
legislative platform does not explains how would be such adjustment and which
would be the scales for the different sectors in the economy. In a more
realistic tone, measures like this would be hardly passed in the Legislative
Assembly. Besides the FMLN has a somewhat similar proposal, the ruling party
would block this motion, because a salary adjustment would affect the
businesses' income.
In economy and environment, PDC commits itself to give "special fiscal
incentives to encourage tree planting and the care of water sources and
environment". As in the case of investment, PDC hopes to influence through
fiscal incentives. At a first glance, this proposal seems interesting, but does
not explain how these incentives would work.
PDC's economic proposals do not explain how would they work. Moreover, some of
them seem to be quite unrealistic. While some of them seem to exceed what a
political party can do —"the renewal of entrepreneurial class"—, some others are
to brief. Under these circumstances, it can be deducted that Christian Democrats
are interested in increasing their deputies, by nurturing in the population a
strong sense of unconformity against ARENA and FMLN. This can be confirmed
because its obvious that many of the points in their platform are used to
criticize the performance of ARENA and the FMLN in the Assembly. Instead of
clearly explaining their legislative proposals, the PDC criticizes the deputies
of both major parties in the country.
The CD-FDR-PPSC coalition agrees with PDC when condemning the confrontation
between the main political parties. However, the center-left coalition goes
beyond this and explains the measures that it would support in the Assembly.
On spite of the lack of concrete proposals, what is true is that Christian
Democrats aspire to maintain some seats in the Assembly. Reading their
legislative platform makes one think that the way to consolidate democracy is
still long. A democracy in which the people do not vote for a color or for old
traditions, but for a realistic legislative agenda that clearly responses for
the Salvadoran people's needs.
Tel: +503-210-6600 ext. 407, Fax: +503-210-6655 |