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Proceso 1114
September 22, 2004
ISSN 0259-9864
 
 

INDEX




Editorial: A mythical hero?

Politics: The crossroads of the FMLN

Economy: An ultimatum for the fiscal policy

 
 
Editorial


A mythical hero?

 

Historically, the economic and the political elite in El Salvador has created myths that have been useful for them to see themselves as the holder of an authority that sank its roots in the glorious exploits of the past. Presently, this elite considers itself the heiress of this past. Their present role, therefore, is legitimized by the past; a past in which their ancestors gave samples of courage, generosity, and self-sacrifice without limits for the sake of building the legacy of which the members of that elite are now the legitimate holders. There are no myths without heroes: the heroes of the Salvadoran right wing are those that inherited the power to this elite and the privileges that its members have historically enjoyed. They promote a cult to honor these heroes and put them in an altar. There are no private mythical heroes: the mythical hero must be seen like so by the society all together, that is, a hero must be turned into a collective myth. Otherwise, this intention to legitimize the image of a hero would not work in a society. The Salvadoran right wing always has understood it that way; that is why their heroes have been turned -through subtle mechanisms (and not so subtle ones as well) of symbolic manipulation- into the heroes of all the Salvadorans.

At the moment, the country is the witness of a double process: the creation of a mythical hero for the right wing, and its conversion into a national mythical hero for all of the Salvadorans. The axis of this mythological creation is Roberto D'Aubuisson, the founder of ARENA. The fact that he is one of the symbols of the Salvadoran right wing is nothing new. The fact that this right wing considers him a hero, because he saved it from the threat that floated over its wealth and privileges, does not make him anything new either. What is indeed new is the effort of this same right wing -that owes so much to D'Aubuisson- trying to turn him into a mythical hero. In order to belong to such a category, the common characteristics of any individual are not enough; one of the requirements is to have accomplished extraordinary things, not just in any sense, but in a precise sense: the honor, the sacrifice, the courage, and the lack of selfishness. The mythical hero, therefore, is not just a hero, but a myth: an individual that sends us to the origins of a group and that, simultaneously, is a model that has to be imitated. Everybody should be like the mythical hero: he is, without discussion, the example to follow.

The Salvadoran right wing insists on making a mythical hero out of the founder of ARENA, in the formerly described sense of the concept. Certainly, the specific individual that was D'Aubuisson had none of the characteristics that would allow anybody to see him as a hero. He was, indeed, a man of the right wing, whose anti-Communism took him to support inhuman and cruel actions, actions that promoted the pain and the death of other human beings. In fact, for what he did and for what he believed in, he is a hero for the right wing, but nothing else. Often enough, however, in the construction of a myth, reality is what counts less. As for the persistence of the right wing on making D'Aubuisson a mythical hero, his reality as a specific man in history is the least important thing. What counts is his extraordinary –made up, without a doubt- characteristics: his commitment, generosity, courage, endurance, and firmness. The real face of D'Aubuisson -his authoritarian, his arrogant, and his insensitive face- must be erased, or even integrated with his "great personality" as his dark, weak side that all mythical heroes have.

To turn D'Aubuisson into a mythical hero means to remove him from the private shrine in which, until recently, the right wing kept him, and to display his image now as a popular hero, like a role model. All the Salvadorans would have to be like him: this seems to be the imperative thought that the right wing wants to turn into the criterion that could regulate the conduct of the Salvadorans. If the members of right wing get away with it, they would turn their hero into a national hero, that is, a public figure that defended the right wing’s power and its privileges turned into a person that fought for the happiness of the people. This achievement would close, as it has happened so many times in the Salvadoran history, a circle of legitimacy: to attack the consecrated hero -the hero that holds the ideals and values of a minority- would be to attack the people.

From this point of view, if the Salvadorans accept D'Aubuisson as a mythical hero -as their hero- this would become one more a mental string that would add itself to many others that are an obstacle to analyze the national reality. The only form to prevent it is, on the one hand, to be aware of D'Aubuisson’s connection with the right wing: he is their hero, not a national hero. On the other hand, no one should forget the real D'Aubuisson, the man who supported violent actions that caused pain and suffering to people who were as patriotic as he was. Only considering the real D'Aubuisson –not the image constructed with loose opinions collected with perverse intentions- it would be possible to reveal how ridiculous it is to try to turn him into a mythical hero.

Without a doubt, there is no use either in trying to turn him into a devil for the Salvadoran society. His share of responsibility for what happened in those tragic years, during the early eighties -when the death squads did whatever they wanted in the light of day- must be rigorously established. This is a subject that goes beyond the journalistic affairs, since it touches the very fibers of the justice system and the structures of power in El Salvador, not only those that prevailed when those crimes were committed, but also the one of the present time. It is not, then, a subject of opinions or commentaries, but a matter of evidence, and those who were assassinated, those who were tortured, and those who disappeared are a relevant part of that evidence. D'Aubuisson is, at least, a suspect –because of what he said, because of what he knew, and because of the paramilitary networks that were created around him- in many of those violent events. He was too close to many of those crimes, and that is why he can be considered as the main suspect. In this sense, D'Aubuisson should be between the eyes of both the national and the international justice; it is this justice the one that must establish his innocence or his culpability. The rest -what friends, acquaintances, or relatives can say to clean his image- is actually just an opinion.

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Politics


The crossroads of the FMLN

 

The political panorama in the country after the celebration of the elections and the presidential inauguration could not be worse for the opposition. Saca is at the peak of the citizens’ preferences. The FMLN, on the other hand, is shipwrecked in an internal crisis that does not leave them time nor space to make sure that their voices are heard in the country’s political debate. In just a couple of years, both the municipal and the legislative elections will be celebrated, and it could be said that if this process follows the same direction, Saca could take control of the majority in the congress.

Since the Peace Accords were signed, no party has managed to control the relative majority in the Legislative Assembly by itself. The closest that ARENA has been to obtaining the 43 necessary seats to hold a relative majority in the congress was in 1994, when it obtained 45% of the people’s votes and 46.4% of seats in the congress. Nevertheless, suddenly, with the twist that the political reality took, there is an actual threat (or a possibility) if ARENA is able to improve its performance during the next legislative elections.

This consideration is not only based on the results of the recent surveys. The present problems of the FMLN have also been considered. With the legal disappearance of the rest of the parties of the opposition -unless the Creole politicians keep inventing legal subterfuges to avoid the fulfillment of the electoral code connected with the cancellation of these political organizations- the election would be a confrontation between two unequal forces: a dying force and an euphoric force, which is presently in the context of a victory and positive evaluation. There is no doubt that the members of the FMLN do not wish to arrive to the next elections in these conditions. The different groups that take part in the internal conflict have presented their ideas to strengthen and renovate their party. In the lines that follow, although the documents available are not official, this article will present a critical interpretation about the contributions made by Handal, the orthodox leader, and the ones made by Oscar Ortiz, the visible face of the renovators. The objective is to see if the members of the FMLN actually have an option to be politically reborn in this particular pre-electoral conjunction.

The vision of the FMLN leaded by Handal
When reading the perspective of this historical leader of the FMLN, one has the sensation that he is describing a party whose many public officials are sunk in the world of corruption. The temptation to monopolize the power of the party makes him feel horrified, and he speaks about monarchic methods adopted by some municipal and departmental leaders. These, in some occasions, says the veteran leader, “usually consider themselves the owners of the party in their Department or Municipality: anything that has to be done there must count with their authorization”.

Beyond those considerations, which appear at the end of the document, Handal’s proposal about the presence of a revolutionary thought in El Salvador, is an observation against the “fellows” that allow themselves to be attracted by the subtleties of the Salvadoran Capitalism, something that makes them think that they need to change, instead of transforming the prevailing unfair system. That is why he considers that it is necessary to repeat “we left the arms, we became part of the system to change the system, and not for the system to change us”.

“The fidelity to the mission, the fidelity to the revolutionary ideas and to the commitment with the people” are the key words to understand Handal’s text. The FMLN was born because of those ideas, and they should be the party’s rock at any moment of uncertainty, says the congressman. Because, “the highest levels of poverty and injustice increased by the Neoliberal Capitalism, legitimize and strengthen even more” the mission of the party. “This is about –according to Handal-, in short, working with that perspective and facing a much more powerful sort of Capitalism, with governments integrated by the owners of the country, those who control them and run the show. They are governments that see themselves not anymore as the allies of a foreign power, but as the unconditional people working under the only pole that still stands in the planet and that tries to become the owner of the world, supported in its super military power “.

In order to be able to face these problems, that are not actually different from the causes that motivated the creation of the FMLN, Shafik Handal thinks that the party cannot succumb to the logic of the parties of masses. This logic kills the militants’ spirit of struggle and keeps avoiding the fact that it is necessary to take the right way to demolish the oppressive capitalist system of the country. The former commander thinks that an example this idea is the inadequately called democratization of the mechanisms to become a member of the FMLN, and what some political leaders have done with this status. “Since the political struggle to become part of the government is possible through the elections, without much of a discussion, there was a strong belief that we had to become a party, as it was said in that time, for the masses, rather than a party of lists, which was a way to prioritize the amount and justify the lack of effort in the ideological and the political education, the rejection of quality. This was how in just a very short time we had a different party because of its composition and the motivations of the people who belong to it”.

The most serious aspect of all this change without order or ideological principles, according to Handal, is that his organization decided to adopt the electoral process of the parties of masses. This way, “to declare that we are still a party of the left wing and a revolutionary party became more of a rite for some people, without a consistent or solid content”. They surrender themselves to the political realism in order to be tolerated by the owners of the system.

For that reason, the historical leader thinks that it is advisable to reaffirm the idea about the meaning of the political realism for the true revolutionaries. “For the revolutionaries, realism responds to another concept: to know and to study reality in order to change it, not to be subjected to it. And viability does not have to do with sacrificing principles or missions, but with knowing how to define and to apply organizational and confrontation strategies able to lead us to a superior level of conscience, to the mobilization of the people, to the creation of alliances, to the accumulation and the correlation of forces to transform the situation”.

The vision of the FMLN leaded by Ortiz
The first thing that calls one’s attention is the similarity that exists between the critical speeches of Ortiz and Hándal about the corruption of some of the public officials from the party. Both of these declarations make us take a closer look at the performance of the public officials of the FMLN. It would be possible to think that the lack of serious reports about the corruption of the public officials from that party was a positive signal, in the sense that the State’s institutions connected to the Public Comptroller’s Office are in the hands of the right wing, and that they could easily use them as political weapons to discredit the left wing. Nevertheless, the declarations of these two leaders of the FMLN are an invitation to reflect more in depth on the subject.

The coincidences end there, though. Unlike Handal, who considers that the party must strengthen itself first in its ideology and avoid the non-revolutionary contamination, Ortiz campaigns for an open party for the society. Not to control the society, but to receive even critical opinions from it.

Ortiz believes that the solution of the country’s problems has to go through a new analysis of the party, and that such analysis has to be very clear for the population. In other words, it could be said that he adopts the position of those that Schafik criticizes, those who let the system shape them before they get to change it themselves. “The different surveys that took place during the last electoral process -says the text of renovators- had something in common: most of the population was in favor of a change. However, the direction of our party misinterpreted the change and the governmental party took advantage of the aspirations for a transformation. This seems odd enough when it is evident to see that the governmental party is responsible for the serious social and economic deterioration of the country”.

This analysis intends to discuss that the electoral defeat was the result of the incapacity of the FMLN leaders. Schafik Handal speaks about the incapacity of the system, and about the lack of will of the owners of the country’s resources to tolerate a revolutionary party that tries to change the roots of the economic system. In order to become a true option of power, Ortiz claims, “we must create a strategy of power according to the country’s reality, and not a simplified and superficial strategy exclusively designed for the particular interests of the present leadership of the FMLN, that sees the problem of the party and the power in the country like their personal patrimony”.

Therefore, it is necessary to reconstruct the party. “So that the FMLN becomes an alternative and seriously outlines itself to become the motor of the transformations during the presidential elections of 2009 –indicates the text -, it is necessary to have a force able to promote a transformation inside the FMLN in order that the party improves its performance. This is not only about changing the faces of the party, but a change of strategy, ideas, methods, and attitudes; as they are now, these elements violate the revolutionary principles and the democracy of the party”.

What is the option?
There is no doubt that the capacity of the FMLN to face the increasing but empty popularity of Saca goes through the solution of its internal division. In any case, in accordance with the aforementioned ideas, there are two different interpretations of the coexistence with the political system. In spite of the declarations made by Handal, his position condemns the FMLN to a permanent state of opposition while they manage to accumulate the necessary strength to make the masses aware about the need to defeat the resistance of the business elite. This is valid as a strategy, but the question is if this goal is reasonable in this national and international political conjunction, or if the masses are actually interested in it.

The position of Ortiz, however, seems to be more compatible with the requirements of the new system. He speaks about the need to overcome the old vices of the party to guarantee that the FMLN is a true option to reach the political power in the country. This is a strategy that does not intend to accumulate revolutionary forces to change the system. In that sense, this proposal is more realistic and coherent, and it is connected with the world’s present situation. Will it count with an internal support to go ahead his proposals? This depends on the answer of the militants for the next internal elections of November. The result of this elections will reveal if the left wing party has chosen the strategy of a permanent opposition to accumulate forces, or if it has decided to take the road of a true transformation to neutralize the populism promoted by Saca.

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Economy


An ultimatum for the fiscal policy

 

In general terms, Saca’s alleged effort to approach people in order to know their necessities and look for solutions to their problems has won high praise from certain individuals. This search focuses itself, as the President mentioned during his electoral campaign, on the development of an effective social policy aimed to improve the conditions in which the Salvadoran population lives.

Nevertheless, although it is a little premature to approach this subject right now, it is possible to say that the Executive begins to experience some limitations in reference to the projection of the performance of the public policies. The limitations come from the fragile macroeconomic stability that the country has had since the year 2000. This policy finds its weakest spot in the delicate situation of the public finances, which have been basically characterized by the increase of the fiscal deficit. In 2003 the deficit became $345 million, including donations, and the increase of the external debt.

The deficit has a perverse effect on the economic activity in both the public and the private sectors. First, it is evident that a low level of collected taxes is an obstacle for the development of an effective economic and social policy, because the amount of social needs goes beyond the low rate of the collected taxes as a proportion of the GNP. That is why the State must seek to obtain international loans, under the concept of the creation of a national debt to pay out the necessary expenses in a fiscal period.

In this sense, the country now has a debt that exceeds 25% of the GNP, the maximum level of indebtedness that the International Monetary Fund (FMI, in Spanish) allows. During this year, the debt adds up to $5,992 million, that is, 38.1 % of the GNP.

On the other hand, if the structure of the Government’s revenue is examined, based on the preliminary data of the Central Bank of Reserve (BCR, in Spanish) for the year 2004, it is possible to observe that the income tax represents 22% of the total revenue, unlike the Value Added Tax, which represents 60% of it. This situation shows that the collection of taxes is terribly regressive, since those who are paying are those who make the lowest incomes, and the business companies barely contribute with the third part of what the final consumer contributes with. In spite of it, the revenue is not enough for the Government, and that is why it intends to get more and more loans, as a strategy to resolve its own mistakes in matters of economic policy.


The problem is that a considerable increase of the national public debt goes against the rate of private investments in the country, because the international companies that examine the risk levels of investment are permanently analyzing the situation of the public finances. The stability in the risk ratings that the government holds with the Fitch Ratings Company is presently located in a category called "no-investment degree". This means that any change in matters of fiscal policy will affect the surroundings of the Salvadoran economy, making the external impacts even more considerable.

This negative risk ratings are combined with a deficient handling and a deficient performance of the country’s public finances. Fitch Ratings has stated that if the public finances are not adjusted and if the government is not able to get the approval of the Legislative Assembly on the set of fiscal measures that have been proposed, the stability of the Salvadoran international risk ratings will be in danger.

That is why it is possible to wonder if, during his period of electoral campaign, the President was capable to see the economic situation of the public sector that he would inherit, or if to obtain the control of the Executive power he followed a political campaign characterized by populism, that is, the political proposals that that a candidate presents to the voters although there are no conditions to actually fulfill them.

The task of this article is not to question if ARENA is interested to get the country out of the economic stagnation, or to wonder if the President intends to promote an effective social policy for the less fortunate. The intention of this article is to discuss the lack of organization of the electoral campaign when it comes to create political proposals that–because of the situation of the public finances- seem to be extremely ambitious. This situation is especially odd when evidently the government is not interested in making substantial transformations to the present economic model to transform the economic and the social development for all Salvadorans.

The two most important aspects in the economic development plan proposed by ARENA are, to a certain extent, misadjusted: a stronger social policy, something that the last administrations of ARENA forgot to promote and, in addition, a promotion of the direct foreign investment for the generation of higher levels of employment and higher rates of economic growth.

The role of the fiscal reform
In a dollarized economy, the official party forgot to consider that, before using dollars as a substitute for colones, it was necessary to have healthy public finances.

Since 2001, the country lost the capacity to manipulate the monetary instruments. The fiscal policy has become the only hope to resolve the external impacts. To this situation it is necessary to add that dollars are not produced in the country. Therefore, they are obtained through exports, and the exports’ rates keep decreasing, because during the first semester of the year they only grew by 1.9%, that is 4% less than the growth of the imports.

In this sense, the Saca administration has proposed a fiscal reform, while the party is still in the middle of a dispute over it. According to the creator of the present governmental plan, Eduardo Zablah, "to establish the total fiscal reform is not the difficult aspect of this whole matter; this is about obtaining the necessary consensus to do it, because the subject of the taxes is not pleasant for anybody ".

President Antonio Saca has said that he will not increase the Value Added Tax (IVA, in Spanish) nor the income taxes, but that he will fight against the evasion of both taxes. On the other hand, Celina Monterrosa, a congress woman of the FMLN, indicated that it is necessary to increase the IVA only when it comes to the sumptuous products.

According to the Executive power these reforms promise to increase, in the short term, the revenue by 1.5% of the GNP, taking it to 3% in the long term. According to the projections, when implementing these reforms, the fiscal deficit would close with 1.5% of the GNP for year 2003 and with 3.2% of the GNP, by the end of the Saca administration, in 2009. It has also been considered that the debt of the non-Financial Public Sector (SPNF, in Spanish) will decrease from 40% to 36% of the GNP in 2009.

While the fiscal reform remains as an urgent factor to implement the social plan of the government, the political parties are still involved in an incessant dispute. The changes that will be made in regard to the fiscal matters will depend on the negotiation skills of all the political parties. Therefore, they will have to set aside their interests and to reach an agreement in favor of the nation.

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