Ten thesis about the institutional performance in El Salvador

The negotiation made to end with the war encouraged a series of positive changes with the intention to build a democratic order. Two of the most important changes were, among others:
1. The creation of several institutions which would work to support the democratic process.
2. The transformation of the institutions -with the intention to face the challenges that the Salvadoran society had- inherited from the past, fully aware about their performance at the service of an authoritarian political activity.
Ten years after the Peace Agreements, what is the actual situation of the institutions in El Salvador? Is it possible to talk about the construction of a democratic institutional performance? What are the most evident weak features of the institutions? Where is the country going to, institutionally speaking?

This group of questions is a reflection point to stop and examine the complex problem of the institutions, but not only from a theoretical perspective, but from the perspective that the reality offers about the last ten years. For a first approximation to the problem, ten thesis about the institutions in El Salvador are proposed in this article. These thesis summarize a considerable amount of well-known facts about the critical situation of the Salvadoran institutions. They also open the door for future discussions about the challenges that the Salvadoran society has to face when it comes to examine the institutional development process.

Thesis 1
El Salvador, an incipient institutional democracy -that is, an institutional body whose only purpose is to guarantee the respect to the legal procedures, the separation of powers, and the defense of the civilian and the political freedom of the citizenry-, was born practically after the signature of the Peace Agreements, when a series of institutions are created with the intention to play a leading role in the construction of a democratic political regime.

Thesis 2
After 1992, the key institutions aimed to build a democratic order are The National Civilian Police (PNC, in Spanish), the Procurator's Office for the Defense of the Human Rights (PDDH, in Spanish), and the National council of the Judicature (CNJ), each one of them had a specific authority, but also a common concern: to defend the dignity of the of the Salvadorans, and guarantee their civilian and juridical security.

Thesis 3
Together with a new institutional perspective, the Peace Agreements pointed out the urgency to make certain changes in many of the already existing institutions, most of them conceived during the time of the military era. Among those institutions were the General Attorney's Office, the Comptroller's Office, and the political parties.

Thesis 4
The refusal to change was immediate in those institutions that already existed before the war. Most of them have insisted on keeping their traditional habits intact with a clear authoritarian attitude: discretion, abuse of power, friendly favors, corruption, and an excessive centralization when it comes to make decisions. The Comptroller's Office is, maybe, the best example of the formerly mentioned authoritarian habits.

Thesis 5
The Attorney General's Office, the Comptroller's Office, and the political parties have not been able to turn themselves into democratic institutions; most of all, they keep using, for many reasons, authoritarian institutional models that belong to the time when they were conceived.

Thesis 6
The new institutions -those who were born into the frame of a democratic effort- have been permanently threatened by a authoritarian reversion, not only externally, but also from within its own ranks. The most important cases are the ones of the Procurator's Office for the Defense of the Human Rights and the National Civilian Police. Both have developed actions (and probably a philosophy) that go against the democratic spirit that gave them life.

Thesis 7
The Salvadoran institutions have an extremely fragile democracy. The institutions specifically designed to become the foundations of a democratic order look weak and without enough energy to work for the objectives they were created for. In the meantime, most of the institutions inherited from the past keep functioning just as they did before the Peace Agreements, that is, without being capable of turning themselves into a part of the foundations that support the democratic process.

Thesis 8
The fact that the group of institutions of this country does not count with a solid democratic foundation means that both the application of the law and that the decision making process mostly obey to the arbitrariness and to the discretion of those who concentrate more economic and political resources, than to the demands of justice and the ones made by the state of right.

Thesis 9
Much of the country's social instability an the collective frustration are the result of the already mentioned weak institutional performance. This situation leads to an environment of suspicion, because of the institutions that seem to be at the service of individual and specific groups of people, and not at the service of the citizenry.

Thesis 10
To strengthen and to recover the institutions created with the Peace Agreements, and to guide those inherited from the past towards democracy is an enormous challenge for the Salvadorans. If this task is not accomplished, not only the ghost of the authoritarian times will keep tormenting El Salvador, but the risk of reaching an uncontrollable situation will be greater.

In summary, El Salvador of these days has a considerable institutional deficit. This country has to overcome such problem in order to put an end to the deterioration of the social harmony. The honesty and the democratic compromise of those responsible for conducting the country are key aspects to improve the democratic process. While the authorities do not fulfill their professional obligations -that is, while they keep responding only to their own interests, or to those of the politicians they feel closer to-, the institutions under their responsibility will go adrift, following the direction of the shady deals, the negotiations settled under the table, the blackmailing, and the friendly favors.

Electoral reforms and political change

The Supreme Court of Justice was about to sign, on May 23rd, the death certificate of the proportional distribution system of the congressmen, which was elaborated based on article 13 of the Electoral Code in force. However, it is not clear yet how the so called "Fathers of the Country" found out about the problems this decision could bring along. Suddenly, with the excuse of avoiding a juridical disaster that could cause a possible questioning of all the laws adopted by this legislature -in case the distribution method of the 84 congressmen was declared incompatible with the Constitution- , the right-wing parties completed (without consulting anyone) the reform made to the questioned law. By doing so, they ended with the dreams of several organizations that wanted to have an impact on the modification of the electoral formula.

Since a while ago, different sectors of the civil society have been questioning the proportional distribution principle of the Legislative Assembly's space. The Plancha Nacional system has been the most vilified one. Its detractors make it responsible for the opacity of the legislative performance and the distance between the legislators and the voters. This idea follows a simple logic: 20 congressmen elected under the Plancha Nacional system do not represent anybody in particular. It would be an euphemism to say that they represent the Salvadoran population. In the end, it is a constituency that allows certain parties to be sure that its most important personalities will be elected. That would reflect all the vices that the system has. The citizenry does not know the elected ones, and many congressmen do not feel that they have the responsibility to explain their actions to the population.

Among the well-known policies to remedy the already mentioned errors are the elimination of the proportional system and the disappearance of the Plancha Nacional. In the first case, a majority's system is proposed with uninominal constituencies. The Pro-Electoral Reform Independent Movement (MIRE, in Spanish), believes that this proposal would resolve the country's political representation crisis. In this new system, the representatives would feel compelled to vote according to the interests of their voters, who, at the same time, can check on their behavior and eventually decide the punishment or the recognition they deserve for the next elections.

Although less radical, those in favor of the disappearance of the Plancha Nacional and the validity of the proportional election system for the congressmen, keep thinking that the 20 national legislators do not offer a satisfactory performance that can benefit the political system. In addition, there is the fact that their administration is far from serving the constitutional precept of the equality of votes. The congressmen of the Plancha would be considered as a sort of freeloaders -that is, that they are taking advantage of someone else's effort-, who, in addition, would be exempt of any electoral adjustment, since they are elected under a residual system of votes (obtained by their parties).

It is evident that it is easily possible to sympathize with the reproaches of the social organizations about the political system's performance. In addition, there is no doubt that the electoral formula, in the case of the Legislative Assembly, has to be examined according to the equality precept of the citizenry's vote. But that does not mean that it would be clever to accept the excuses about an inefficient performance, or -what is even more important- assume that the solution proposals are the most effective ones. That would be a considerable risk. In fact, there is no empirical evidence that can enable anyone to say that the little connection existing between the interests defended by the congressmen and those of their voters is the result of the present proportional representation system, or a consequence of the existence of the 20 congressmen of the Plancha Nacional. It cannot be said that the uninominal constituency will resolve the problem. The defenders of a majority's system commit a terrible mistake. They end up proposing an inadequate solution to the problem. Only someone who completely ignores the election system’s procedure can propose a governance resort (a majority's system) for a political representation problem (which, theoretically, has to be treated with a proportional system). This does not mean that it is impossible to improve the proportional electoral system. It is important to realize now that the proposals do not respond to the diagnosis.

On the other hand, it is necessary to say that the rushed reform of article 13 of the Electoral Code has not helped to take care of the electoral formula problem. In this sense, it is not only necessary to listen to the society and the rest of the members of the political system, but it also seems convenient to discuss the objectives of the proportional system and its eventual relation with other fields of politics. This is the case of the Municipal Councils and their electoral formula, which should follow this modality. There are so many questions about the performance of the electoral system, its political objectives, and its negative impacts in the social and the political life of this country, that the discussion was postponed once again. In any case, ARENA and its allies did not give this opportunity to the society. It is necessary to wait for the answer of the Supreme Court of Justice about the new reform to reopen the possibility to discuss such an important issue.

Now it is convenient to center the debate and search for some solutions that can adequately respond to the diagnosis. This is not about a political altruism, as some people seem to understand this process. This issue can make the parties reflect about what they can win and what they can eventually lose. At a first glance, it will be much harder to convince the parties (those with a higher number of members) that the Plancha Nacional is a business deal that they have to walk away from. It is designed for their personal gratification, and it is hard to believe that they will easily accept to give up their electoral advantages.

The former ideas are necessary to examine two important considerations. In the first place, the point is not to count with the good will of the parties. They are institutions that intend to exploit the electoral system as much as possible in order to guarantee their political advantages. In the second place, the necessary changes cannot be completed by being against the political parties. It would not only be a counterproductive decision, but it would also be doomed to fail, that is why the political parties would see it as a threat against their interests in the electoral system. The right-wing's reaction seems to obey to this kind of fear, and the social organizations that fight to accomplish certain reforms inside the electoral system should consider this information, so that when another opportunity to change comes along they can take full advantage of it.

It is necessary to say that the political change that El Salvador requires will not be possible only with the modifications proposed for the electoral formula, in the case of the elections for the Legislative Assembly. It is necessary to set new political objectives and completely examine the electoral system, in order to discover the elements that allow or hinder to accomplish them. It would be important to start discussing the “presidential” issue. In El Salvador, this subject encourages the authoritarian actions, which ooze an air from the past.

Some reflections about unemployment and underemployment

During the last two years, the unemployment problem has become more critical, turning the condition of the labor market even more precarious. For instance, by the end of 2001, the Minister of Economy, Miguel Lacayo, said that the year had negative tendencies: an unemployment level of 7% of the Economically Active Population (PEA, in Spanish), the loss of 50,000 jobs because of the earthquakes, and 10,000 more because of the fall in the prices of coffee. According to the same information, another 2,000 job positions would have been closed at the maquilas.

The positive information that Lacayo gave was that 25,000 new jobs were generated. The public official expected that with the free trade agreements more positions could be opened. However, during the first trimester of 2001 8,404 job positions of the public sector were eliminated, and another 905 were opened, which technically means that 7,499 job positions were lost, and this is equivalent to almost 7.4% of the total number of job positions at the public sector.

In the private sector as well as in the public one, the activities related to the employment issue have not been favorable, although this has happened for different reasons. In the case of the private sector, there have been important changes in the behavior of the employment levels due to aspects such as the contraction of the agricultural sector, the economic slowdown and the fall in the international prices of coffee, just to mention the most evident ones. As for the public sector, the behavior of the employment level has been subjected to the policies derived from a highly ideological vision, which promote an indiscriminate dismantling of the state's institutional activities, which later turns into the elimination of the job positions. It is necessary to examine the behavior of the unemployment and the underemployment levels of the last decades, using both statistic and descriptive terms.

In 1980, the unemployment level was 5.2%, since there were 79,212 people unemployed and a PEA of 1,519,454 people. In 1990, the unemployment level reached approximately a 9.9%, to later descend along that decade to 6.9% in 1999. According to the official versions, the unemployment level has been sort of stable during the last two years -according to the Minister of Economy, the unemployment level for 2001 was 7%-.

Apparently this is not a critical problem, however, the truth is that this figure hides a very different reality, characterized by the presence of different kinds of underemployment occupations, the formal employment -partially related with this phenomenon- and the low wages.

Underemployment is measured by two standards: when the worker earns less than the amount stipulated as the minimum wage, even if he works for forty or more hours per week (invisible underemployment), or in case that he works less than 40 hours per week (visible underemployment). The underemployment level in El Salvador is much higher than the unemployment level, approximately 50% of the PEA was underemployed by 1999. Consequentially, it can be said that approximately a 57% of the PEA was not fully employed, that is, they were not working for forty or more hours a week, and they did not earn a salary equal or higher than the legal minimum wage.

Most of the underemployment level is generated in the formal sector -in fact, this is one of the implicit objectives of a flexible labor - but also inside the informal sector, where most of the population that appears as "employed" belongs. They are actually dedicated to subsistence activities, with inadequate working conditions, a low and unstable income, and without any access to the Social Security aid. The "employed" concept, used by the government, is so lax that it is open to any interpretation, since it includes "economically active people, who have a job and obtain an income or a profit, or work without a currency payment in a family business". Practically every worker is included in this definition, even those who do not receive any income at all, or those who do not even earn the minimum wage.

This leads us to the low income issue and the prevailing salaries. This is an evident subject if it is considered that the officially declared poverty levels (almost half of it) strongly contrast with an unemployment level of 7%. The apparent contradiction can only be understood by accepting that a considerable amount of those employed receive an income that can be located under the poverty line. For example, the almost 90,000 women who work at the textile maquilas receive the urban minimum wage ($144 a month), and this is considered -even under the governmental standards- as an income close to the extreme poverty line, because that amount does not cover the price of the basic food basket and because it could only cover half the price of the complete basic basket (food, housing, clothing, and other needs). The situation is the same or worse for the activities of the informal sector.

An aspect that has to be discussed is that the Salvadoran economy is not capable to generate enough employment in order to reduce the unemployment level in the way it did along the nineties (from 9.9% to 7%). The unemployment levels have been reduced mostly because of the reduction of the PEA growth rates that were experimented during that decade, and also because of the migration to other countries, especially to The United States. This migration process was stimulated in the beginning by the political and the military conflict, and later by the unemployment crisis and the rural inadequate living conditions.

Fortunately for the Salvadorans, the unemployment crisis is finding a escape passage through migration to other markets of employment, mainly in The United States. In addition, and in an almost paradoxical way, this migratory process has also turned into a lifesaver for the weakened Salvadoran economy, given the amount of family remittances that the immigrant workers send ($1,970 million), and because of their important contribution to the macroeconomic stabilization (because they compensate the commercial balance's deficit, increase the added demand, and stabilize the rate of exchange, and the inflation, among other things).

The Salvadoran work market reveals, therefore, two critical realities:
1. Its incapacity to absorb a growing PEA.
2. A strong presence of jobs that condemn the workers to underemployment and poverty. The reduction of the unemployment levels hides the fact that a considerable part of the PEA has emigrated, while the figures show by themselves the existence of an employed but poor population.

The unemployment and the underemployment problem in El Salvador will not end by attracting business companies interested in the maquila field. It will not end with the free trade agreements either, as the government intends people to believe. The maquila only generates poorly remunerated and temporary jobs, while the free trade agreements are not a guarantee to obtain higher investments, production or employment. On the contrary, the free trade agreements can turn into more imports as well as into the disappearance of the small business companies that are in no condition to compete with gigantic enterprises.

The employment at the maquila and the migration of the workers can be seen as a temporary solution to such a serious problem: a combination of unemployment and underemployment. Neither the maquilas nor the migration process can be considered as the "poles of development". It is a mistake to focus energies and policies on these "poles". What is definitively required is the promotion of the investments in activities that have a high added value, better salaries, and better perspectives of an insertion into the global economy; something that definitively goes through a process of more education, professional and technical training, and social benefits for the economically active population.